The recent research has brought to daylight a huge number of documents about Pearl Harbor (PH). There are offical court hearing documents (1941-46), several documents provided by foreign inteligence, embassies and governments, documents of the soldiers, etc. Mr Stinnett has obtained 200.000 documents and a number of other investigators have completed his work. All the old stories are now worthless as they dont have any basis in documentation.

The indisputable fact is that Roosevelt (FDR) wanted to enter the European war, but a majority of US people were strongly against. FDR mentioned in several connections that he has a backdoor to war - Japan, which had a collaboration agreement with Germany (and Italy). FDR made political decisions which were completely unacceptable to Japan and he actually forced Japan for war.

FDR planned an event where Japan was persuaded to attack PH - and make the first shot - and this catastrophy was expected to change the attitude of Americans pro war. FDR and his staff made a number of orders to protect the Japanese fleet so that it was able to enter PH without any disturbance from the military and commercial fleet. The result was a fancy terrorism attack - just like 911 - and the American people immediatelly supported war and donated their last dollar to the war machine.

After the war, the court investigated the betrayal - conspiracy. FDR together with some commanders were convicted of crime, but this was never released for publicity. The fear was that the conspiracy led by the president of USA is a major humiliation and catastrophy which cannot be revealed. Thus, the Americans were never told that their president has supported the murder of 3000 of his own soldiers. There were 30 governmental persons in the conspiracy and they decided to destroy all the evidence - even if they agreed that there will once be a Final Judge which will treat them as other criminals, too. What is the lesson learnt?

Nothing, according to this book.

Actually, I've read very little of the circumstances surrounding Pearl Harbour.

Is there a public record now of those that were convicted? As far as I know, all government documents if not destroyed, are declassified after 30 years.

And, why not? People lose interest after 5 years, surely, thirty obliterates just about everything.

My father has always pointed out tht the modern US aircraft carriers were out on the Pacific, while some old battleships and cruisers were left in Pearl Harbor in early December 1941. Thus, the attack was not at all as fatal to the US navy as it could have been. This was evident from the start and is circumstantial evidence that goes to prove that high ranking US officials probably knew what would happen.

__________________
President Josiah Bartlet: Sweden has a 100% literacy rate. 100%! How do they do that?
Leo McGarry: Maybe they don't and they can't add.

Don't elect a Democrat who needs to distract the public from his domestic policies?

__________________
Today's forecast: Government corruption.

Tomorrow's forecast: 100% chance of more 'politics as usual'

Maybe it's finally time to vote Libertarian

In the court hearing documents which were obtained using the new information act and other materials it is known who participated to the conspiracy - they were 30 higher politicians, officers and military commanders. The names of some are mentioned in the references linked bellow.

Why the docoments were again recently classified - they were declassified by accident, but when some researcher wrote an article about 911 analogy they were again classified. There is a governmental decision that Roosevelt's communications will be never released for public - WHY?

The lesson learnt was that it is possible in the US court to hide the truth in order to save the president. The president was convicted for crime, but it was never published and implemented (FDR died 1945).

Imagine if this is also the case with 911 - the president is using the conspiracy to his political purposes and the people do not know the truth...and will never know. Therefore, the 911 investigation should be reopened - urgently. If you read the "conspiracy pages of 911", thousands of extremely qualified experts are 100% sure that the government has planned and supported the 911-crime. Certainly one part of the plan has been to involve foreigners (arabs?) to the manouver certainly without telling them what is behind. This was also the case in the WTC 1993 bombing, where the Egyptian Mr. Salem was hired by FBI to explode the bomb - Mr Salem understood the danger and tape recorded the fee negotiations with FBI and was right - soon after the bomb he was arrested...but his lawyer had the tapes and he was released (the FBI agents were named and identified). Many other arabs were put to jail just to cover up the FBI conspiracy.

These examples are very disturbing - millions of innocent civilians have already been killed by using these orchestrated "evidence".

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html

You desperately need a credible source for this.


I would also point out that, the US declared war on Japan the day after Pearl Harbor, but they did NOT declare war on Germany or Italy and didn't give the impression that they seriously intended to.
It was Hitler, NOT FDR who made the declaration of war between the US and Germany (December 11th) and officially brought the United States into the European war.
It seems strange, if FDR caused/allowed Pearl Harbor to happen in order to enter the European war, that he didn't immediately take advantage of it when it happned.
It is also noteworthy that Hitler's alliance with Japan (Tripartite Pact) did not require him to declare war on America and his ministers strongly argued against it. So there's no way FDR could have been certain that Germany would do the declaring of war for him.

FDR has been reported to have several times mentioned the so called back-door to European war - Japan. His biggest problem was that more than 80 % of Americans did not want to go for the war. FDR promised to British Churchill that he will join the war and find a way how to change US attitudes to pro war....and his discovery was P Harbor. After the attack he had a heated talk to the American people about the terrorists who have killed thousands of innocent Americans and destroyed their base. And immediatelly the attitudes changed and FDR got green light to war. When Japan announced the war, the Germans did the same as agreed between the countries. FDR had reached his objectives. He attacked - not Japan, but Germany. (Similarily 911 was used to attack to a country which did not have anything to do with 911).

Here are the official Naval Court Hearing documents which reveal the facts very well and also the conviction of FDR:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_0.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/invest.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/extra.html
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-6.htm
http://ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/

Alright boys and girls, I'm about ready to put this to rest.
Analyst, thank you for the several hundred pages of source material "supporting" your claim. I was only starting on the first one when I found the following. I repeat, this was your source.


From the Report on the INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK conducted by the JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (1946).
Specifically I quote from Part V. Conclusions and Recommendations (page 251).

enjoy.

If there are contradictory findings buried in the other sources provided, I'd welcome to oppretunity to review them. But unless a specific page and quote is given, I'm through digging through tomes of data trying to validate obscure conspiracy theories. This seems pretty darn conclusive.

>Dilettantte: you have picked some text which is a hypothesis - not the result. Here are some texts from the conviction (from tha Naval Court Hearings, p. 555 etc - this is not copyrighted text so I hope you allow me to copy a bit lengthy text):

Having decided against an appeal to Congress for a declaration of war
and having resolved that he would avoid even the appearance of an overt
act against Japan, the President chose the alternative of waiting for an
overt act by Japan-an attack on territory of the United States.
Possessing full power to prepare for meeting attack and for countering
it with the armed forces under his command, he had supreme
responsibility for making sure that the measures, plans, orders, and
dispositions necessary to that end were taken.

17. *High authorities in, Washington failed to allocate to the Hawaiian
commanders the material which the latter often declared to be necessary
to defense and often requested, and no requirements of defense or war in
the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities or their failures in
this respect*.

The President it is true had powers and obligations under the Lease-Lend Act of March 1941. But his first and inescapable duty under the Constitution and laws was to care for the defense and security of the United States against a Japanese attack, which he knew was imminent; and, in the allocations of materiel, especially bombing and reconnaissance planes, he made or authorized decisions which deprived the Hawaiian commanders of indispensable materiel they could otherwise have had and thus reduced their defensive forces to a degree known to be dangerous by high officials in Washington and Hawaii.

These failures in Washington were:

(a) High Washington authorities did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel
and General Short adequate information of diplomatic negotiations and of
intercepted diplomatic intelligence which, if communicated to them,
would have informed them of the imminent menace of a Japanese attack in
time for them to fully alert and prepare the defense of Pearl Harbor.

(b) High Washington authorities did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel
and General Short such vital intercepted Japanese intelligence
information as the "bomb plot" messages and the "dead-line messages"
which, if so communicated, would have served as specific warnings of
impending hostile attack. In particular, the "bomb plot" messages
directly concerned the safety of the fleet and security of the naval
base at Pearl Harbor (and at no other place) and if communicated to the
Hawaiian commanders would have informed them of specific Japanese
designs affecting Pearl Harbor in time for them to alert and prepare
their defense.

(c) By conflicting and imprecise messages and orders high Washington
authorities created such a condition of confusion relative to what the
Hawaiian commanders were to do and were not to do about alerting and
preparing for defense at Pearl Harbor, as to remove from such commanders that clear responsibility which would have otherwise attached to them by reason of their positions.

(d) High Washington authorities positively misled the commanders at
Hawaii by indicating in messages sent to Hawaii the probability that
Japanese hostile actions were likely to take place at points in the
Southwestern Pacific without mentioning the danger of attack at Hawaii.
...the high Washington authorities misled the Hawaiian commanders and so contributed to their unpreparedness in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

(e) High Washington authorities took over so much of the detailed
direction ... Having thus weakened the individual
obligations of the Hawaiian commanders and having failed correspondingly
to provide them with clear and adequate orders, high Washington
authorities reduced the responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders in the
defense of Pearl Harbor.

(f) Having failed to provide the Hawaiian commanders with sufficient,
adequate, and appropriate materiel and equipment for the defense of
Hawaii, high Washington authorities compelled the Hawaiian commanders to make choices of action jeopardizing their defense which they would not have made on their own responsibility had they had the needed materiel and equipment; and this failure in Washington was a strong factor in the failure of the defense at Hawaii.

(g) The responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders was further reduced by explicit orders from Washington not to do anything to alarm the civil population and that the high authorities in Washington: desired Japan to commit the first overt act.

(h) ...Washington authorities had the obligation to
correct all wrongful decisions at Hawaii which had been made in response
to Washington orders. A crucial decision of this kind was made by
General Short when he alerted his command only against sabotage in
response to orders .... This error, as later proved, left the defenses
at Hawaii particularly vulnerable to external attack.

(i) In the critical hours from the afternoon of December 6 to 10:30 a.
m. on December 7, Washington authorities failed to take the instant
action called for by their special knowledge of Japanese messages on
those days which would have placed the Hawaiian commanders on the
specific alert for probable danger to Hawaii.

The conclusion that "everybody" in the chain of authority "from the
higher officials here in Washington down through the lieutenant who
disregarded the radar message at Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning,
December 7, just muffed the situation, let the Japs outsmart them," was
expressed by Representative Clark in the form of a question put to
Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Kimmel replied: "I think
you should draw those conclusions, sir, rather than me." Mr. Clark then
said "That is all I have, Mr. Chairman."

The President decided against appealing to Congress for a declaration of war on Japan, they were all waiting for the Japanese to fire the first shot!
And in those circumstances it was their duty to prepare definite plans
and procedures for action in meeting that attack.

This is exactly what they did not do at any time before December 7.

They prepared no plan giving the outpost commanders instructions about
the measures they were to take in preparing for and meeting a Japanese
attack on American possessions when and if it came... With modifications
appropriate to the various outposts this plan could have been sent to
the respective commanders by couriers or swifter means of communication.
And a procedure could have been adopted for instructing the commanders
by one word in code, or a few words, to put plans for meeting Japanese
attack into effect. No such plan was drawn up or at all events no such
plan was sent to the commanders. No procedure for giving them the code
word or words for action under any plan or procedure was ever adopted by the authorities in Washington whose official duty it was to prepare,
with all the resources at their command, for meeting the Japanese attack which they privately recognized as an imminent menace.

20. The President of the United States failed to take
that quick and instant executive action which was required by the
occasion and by the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship
rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the
establishment of the Republic to our own times*.

Although the War Cabinet, as early as November 28, had anticipated the
situation of noon of December 6 as making war inevitable, the Chief of
Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations not only did not advise the commanders in the field as to this situation, but also
exhibited so little concern approximately 20 hours later that the Chief
of Staff went horseback riding on the morning of December 7 and the
Chief of Naval Operations, having spent the evening at a theater, got to his office late on the morning of the 7th. Each of these officers knew on the morning of December 7 that a Pacific war would start within a few hours and, by their own judgment and that of the President, that such war must involve the United States. In the light of the situation known to them and to the president and his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy on the morning of December 7, and in view of the decisions reached in anticipation of such a situation, an alert should have been sent to Hawaii prior to the alert sent by commercial cable by General Marshall on December 7 at 11:50 a. m., which alert did not reach the Hawaiian commanders prior to the attack-the November 27 and all prior alerts having been confusing, misleading, and imprecise.

Before 10 o'clock on the evening of December 6, 1941, President
Roosevelt had reached a great decision as to the immediate imminence of
the war which he had long expected. He had then finished reading the
first 13 parts of the intercepted memorandum which was to be presented
to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador and special agent on the
next day, and had said to his aide, Harry Hopkins, in substance, "This
means war." In reply to a comment by Mr. Hopkins, the President had also indicated that the United States could not strike the first blow for the purpose of preventing any sort of surprise.

The President had at his disposal at least 15 hours in which to inform those outpost commanders of impending danger, to add new and urgent warning to the indefinite warnings that had been sent out during previous days and weeks.

The President's acquaintance with the nature of warfare, and it was by
no means elementary, must have convinced him that the consequences of
the first magnitude would flow from the success or failure of the United States armed forces in meeting the Japanese attack when it came.
Unqualified success on the part of the American forces could wreck
Japanese war plans and cripple Japanese armed forces. Disaster to the
armed forces of the United States could, and probably would, prolong the war for months or years, with all that was entailed in American blood and treasure.

In this situation, having decided about 10 p. m. December 6, that the
intercepted message meant war, the most imperative duty that confronted
the President was that of alerting his immediate subordinates in
Washington and, either directly or through them, the outpost commanders.

…

Within less than an hour President Roosevelt, convinced that the 13-part
message meant war, could have brought to his side one or more of the
four men immediately responsible for war action under his direction,
could have taken council with them, and could decide upon the orders
necessary to alert all the outpost commanders before midnight.

In this situation with these powers and obligations entrusted to him,
what did the President do? Recognizing the gravity of the hour and the
occasion, he was moved to act-at first. He tried to reach by telephone,
the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and at the first attempt
failed. Apparently it was reported to the President that Admiral Stark
was at a theater. What then? According to the testimony of Commander
Schulz, who had brought the 13-part message to the President's room in
the White House, the President said in the presences of the commander,
that he did not want to cause any undue alarm by having Admiral Stark
paged or otherwise notified in the theater, "because he (the President)
could get him (Admiral Stark) within perhaps another half hour" (Tr.,
Vol. 63, pp. 12443-44).

Captain Krick had informed Admiral Stark that they had been together on the evening of December 6, 1941 and that the admiral had been in communication with the President over the telephone.

What did the President do on Sunday morning between his rising hour and
about 1:25 p. m. when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began?

About 5 o'clock in the morning of December 7, the fourteenth part of the Japanese message reached the Navy Department. Although it could have been decoded in less than half an hour, that operation was delayed in the office and this fourteenth part did not come into the hands of Captain Kramer until about 7:30 a. m. Another inexplicable delay occurred. Captain Kramer did not deliver this message to the White House until 10 or 15 minutes before 10 on Sunday morning. But 2 hours or more then remained in which to put the outpost commanders of full defensive war alert.

On or about 10:30 on Sunday morning, two other highly informative
messages were delivered at the White House.

The first was the intercepted Japanese government message instructing
the Japanese ambassador to deliver the fourteen-part reply to the
Secretary of State at 1 P. m. December 7.

21. *The contention committing from so high an authority as President
Truman on August 3, 1945, that the "country is as much to blame as any
individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor,"
cannot be sustained because the American people had no intimation
whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken*.

How could the American people be held responsible for the secret
diplomacy of Washington authorities? They were never advised of the many
secret undertakings by Washington authorities. Indeed, the high
authorities in Washington seemed to be acting upon some long-range plan
which was never disclosed to Congress or to the American people.

A nation in mortal danger is entitled to know the truth about its peril.
If foreign policy and diplomatic representations are treated as the
exclusive secret information of the President and his advisors, public
opinion will not be enlightened. A people left in the dark by their
leaders cannot be held responsible for the consequences of their
leader's actions.
…

The Secretary of War, the President and his advisors also were fully
aware that Japanese military movements were under way and that these
movements would involve the United States in war.

In the light of these facts and of the foregoing conclusions, the charge
that the "country" is to blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor cannot
be sustained.

The failure to perform the responsibilities indispensably essential the
defense of Pearl Harbor rests upon the following civil and military
authorities:

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT-President of the United States and Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy.

HENRY L. STIMSON-Secretary of War.
FRANK KNOX-Secretary of the Navy.
GEORGE C. MARSHALL-General, Chief of Staff of the Army.
HAROLD R. STARK-Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.
LEONARD T. GEROW-Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans
Division.
The failure to perform the responsibilities in Hawaii rests upon the
military commanders:
WALTER C. SHORT-Major General, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL-Rear Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Can you give me a link to this text?

Dilettante

The text comes from the US Congress - Naval Court (US Government has done everything to hide the truth from US people, which does not deserve truth - just lies as usually - otherwise they would not give their last dollars to the war machine):

Here are the official Naval Court Hearing documents which reveal the facts very well and also the conviction of FDR:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_0.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/invest.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/extra.html
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-6.htm
http://ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/

Please, make a comparison with 911!

Ok. I have those links already. They go to hundreds (if not thousands) of pages of documentation. I want to know where in all of that text you're copying your quotes from. I can't dig through the entire transcript and notes of the hearing looking for your context.
I need to be able to see what section of the hearing you're quoting from and what the context is.

Please go to the pages 555-580 - in the first document there is a table of contents.

There are also pages of scientists which are easier to read. I will try to point some (please, be careful with these sources because there are also fiction stories around - all the new materials are explicit).

When General Marshall ordered the Pearl Harbor affair hushed up shortly after the attack, he said, "Gentlemen, this goes to the grave with us." But some believe that the grave is not a safe repository. As Admiral Kimmel said, the perpetrators of the Pearl Harbor betrayal "must answer on the Day of Judgement like any other criminal." There is one judge who will never be compromised.

http://www.independent.org/events/tr...asp?eventID=28
http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/20...no12_facts.htm
http://www.disinfo.com/archive/pages...le/id1488/pg1/
http://www.thenewamerican.com/focus/...rbor/index.htm

Nevermind. Mystery solved.

Alright, here's the scoop. My quote from post #8 came from the official conclusion of the Congressional commitee investing Pearl Harbor. They looked at the evidence and decided, as a whole, that FDR was not responsible and that he and the government had done everything possible to prevent a war with Japan.

HOWEVER, not every member of the commitee agreed with the majority decision. As is standard practice in most American judicial decisions, the minority were also allowed to express their views and they did so at the end of the report. Analyst's lengthy quotes come entirely from these minority positions and can be found here: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congr...ority.html#565 under the following introduction:
These do NOT represent the finding of Congress, only the opinions of those who disagreed with those findings.

Nothing in the Report from the Investigation of Pearl Harbor convicts the President or his officials of any crimes and the conclusions, as spelled out in the report (again I refer you to post #8), both mention and then firmly REJECT the theory that FDR "tricked, provoked,incited, cajoled, or coerced Japan into attacking this Nation in order that a declaration of war might be more easily obtained from the Congress."

On a final note, I see no firm connection between 9/11 and Pearl Harbor other than that both were obviously unprecedented offensive strikes and were a complete surprise to the American public at large.

Found 'em (see above post).
Page 494 - 572 are clearly marked as a Minority Report. They do not represent the findings of Congress as a whole and certainly cannot be said to convict the president of a crime. They're the arguments a minority who disagree with the official findings.