I believe Wisconsin Public Radio had been doing a special report on Roosevelt for the past month and a half.

FDR intentionally provoked the attack on Pearl. While it can be debated if FDR knew that Pearl would be the target, it is obvious to thinking people that the reason the Pacific fleet was moved to Pearl was to give the Japs an attractive target.

Admiral Richardson ruined his career arguing against the move, refusing at first to move the fleet to Pearl because it was not secure.

The McCollum memo proves that FDR intentionally provoked the attack, even if it can't be proven he ever saw the memo. All suggestions in that memo were implemented.

A great article is from New American magaxine...........'

http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/20...no12_facts.htm

Oliver Lyttleton, British Minister of Production, stated in 1944: "Japan was provoked into attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history to say that America was forced into the war."

The bait offered Japan was our Pacific Fleet. In 1940, Admiral J.O. Richardson, the fleet’s commander, flew to Washington to protest FDR’s decision to permanently base the fleet in Hawaii instead of its normal berthing on the U.S. West Coast. The admiral had sound reasons: Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to attack, being approachable from any direction; it could not be effectively rigged with nets and baffles to defend against torpedo planes; and in Hawaii it would be hard to supply and train crews for his undermanned vessels. Pearl Harbor also lacked adequate fuel supplies and dry docks, and keeping men far from their families would create morale problems. The argument became heated. Said Richardson: "I came away with the impression that, despite his spoken word, the President was fully determined to put the United States into the war if Great Britain could hold out until he was reelected."

Richardson was quickly relieved of command. Replacing him was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. Kimmel also informed Roosevelt of Pearl Harbor’s deficiencies, but accepted placement there, trusting that Washington would notify him of any intelligence pointing to attack. This proved to be misplaced trust. As Washington watched Japan preparing to assault Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel, as well as his Army counterpart in Hawaii, General Walter C. Short, were completely sealed off from the information pipeline.

Much more at the article above and at this great research piece...........

TOQ-Stephen J. Sniegoski-Pearl Harbor-Vol 1 No 2

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January 27, 1941 Joseph C. Grew, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, wired Washington that he had learned information that Japan, in the event of trouble with the U.S., was planning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

April: U.S. intelligence officers continue to monitor Japanese secret messages. In a program code-named Magic, U.S. intelligence uses a machine to decode Japan's diplomatic dispatches. Washington does not communicate all the available information to all commands, including Short and Kimmel in Hawaii.

May: Japanese Adm. Nomura informs his superiors that he has learned Americans were reading his message traffic. No one in Tokyo believes the code could have been broken. The code is not changed.

July: Throughout the summer, Adm. Yamamoto trains his forces and finalizes the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Sept. 24: The "bomb plot" message from Japanese naval intelligence to Japan's consul general in Honolulu requesting a grid of exact locations of ships in Pearl Harbor is deciphered. The information is not shared with the Hawaii's Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short.

http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/RD-PEARL.html

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After 24 November 1941, events in U.S.-Japanese diplomatic negotiations moved very swiftly to their climax on 7 December. A number of important diplomatic messages passed between Tokyo and Washington between July and November; these are summarized below. These early messages and those exchanged after 24 November which have been selected for inclusion in this appendix are so revealing that it is easy to lose sight of the fact that U.S. officials were often reading these messages at about the same time as the Japanese diplomats. The "War Warning" messages sent by OPNAV beginning on 24 November have also been included in this appendix to insure that the reader fully appreciates their correlation with events occurring in diplomatic circles.

N 25 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 15 November with detailed instructions on how to destroy code machines.
N 28 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 19 November with detailed instructions to listen for "Winds Execute" messages to be added to Japanese news broadcasts in case of diplomatic emergencies involving the U.S., England, or Russia. When heard, embassies were to destroy all codes, papers, etc.
N 26 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 19 November, sent after above message but translated earlier, contained instructions to listen for an abbreviated "Winds" message in general intelligence broadcasts repeated five times at beginning and end, i.e., only the word East, West, or North would be spoken five times.
A 28 Nov Circular message from Tokyo on 20 November said U.S.-Japanese situation would not "permit any further conciliation by us" and rejected all feelings of optimism.
A 22 Nov Tokyo informed Washington on 22 November that, by 29 November if agreement had not been reached, "things are automatically going to happen."
24 Nov OPNAV message warned of possible Japanese "aggressive movement" toward Philippines, Guam, or any direction.
A 26 Nov Tokyo message to Washington on 26 November contained telephone brevity code to be used because "telegrams take too long." The code covered topics under negotiation, situations, and personalities.
27 Nov OPNAV WAR WARNING message.
A 29 Nov Message on 26 November from Nomura to Tokyo recommended that Japan break diplomatic relations with the U.S. in a formal manner rather than "enter on scheduled operations" without prior announcement particularly since "our intention is a strict military secret." A formal break would avoid responsibility for the "rupture."
N 2 Dec A circular message from Tokyo on 27 November contained another brevity code in which codewords were assigned specific meanings, e.g., "Japan's and USA's military forces have clashed" equals, "HIZIKATA MINAMI."

-68-

page 69

N 28 Nov A telephone conversation on 27 November between Washington (Kurusu) and a foreign office official in Tokyo named Yamamoto. Tokyo used telephone code to convey a message referring to an attack on the U.S.
29 Nov OPNAV WAR WARNING message. Text indicated Army had also been notified.
A 1 Dec Message from Tokyo to Berlin on 30 November directed the Japanese ambassador to inform Germany that U.S. relations had ruptured and that "war may break out quicker than anyone dreams." Regarding Russia, Tokyo stated that if Russia reacted to her move southward and joined hands with England and the U.S., Japan was "ready to turn on her with all our might." Tokyo requested the Germans and Italians to maintain "absolute secrecy."
N 1 Dec Message from Tokyo to Washington discussed means of allaying U.S. suspicions regarding Japanese reactions to the U.S. proposal of 26 November. News media were to be advised that "negotiations are continuing." A plan was discussed to make a formal presentation in Washington vice Tokyo. The message queried president's reaction to Tojo's bellicose speech.
N 1 Dec A circular message from Tokyo on 1 December advised Washington that London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila had been instructed to destroy code machines.
2 Dec OPNAV instructed CINCAF to establish defensive patrols.
A 4 Dec Message from Rome to Washington on 2 December said that Tokyo believed the Hull note of 26 November "absolutely unacceptable," and "a conflict(?) in the near future is considered very probable." Rome also said Tokyo believed American Navy in Pacific was "not strong enough for decisive action."
N 3 Dec Message from Tokyo to Washington on 2 December instructed Washington to burn all codes except one copy of the codes being used in conjunction with the machine (i.e., PURPLE, the O Code, and the abbreviation code. Washington was also to burn messages, other secret papers, and telegraphic codes, and possibly to destroy one machine.
3 Dec An OPNAV message regarding Japanese instructions to burn codes.
N 6 Dec Messages from Berlin and Rome to Tokyo on 3 December described Japanese attempts to obtain German and Italian assurances that they would follow the Japanese declaration of war on the U.S. with their own. Hitler was not available, but Mussolini agreed.

-69-

page 70

4 Dec OPNAV ordered U.S. codes destroyed.
N 6 Dec Washington confirmed destruction of codes on 5 December.
N 6 Dec Tokyo message on 5 December ordered four individuals in Washington to leave immediately. The translation contained a note which identified one as head of Japanese espionage in the Western Hemisphere and the others as his assistants.
A 6 Dec Tokyo message to Washington on 6 December alerted Nomura that a formal reply to the 26 November note had been prepared, was very long, and would be in 14 parts.

The messages quoted in this appendix are taken from Radio Intelligence Publication Number 87Z, "The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War," Vol. I, Section A, by Ensign John V. Connorton, USNR. SRH-012, RG 457.

Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924-1941

These are from What Really Happened.

I have not verified these, but I can't think of any "fake" government documents I have ever found on the net.


Dec. 3 N 6991 25644 Tokyo 111 Make your "ships in harbor"

report irregular but twice a

week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19).

**Dec. 4 N 7001 JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to

be the (missing) translation of

the Winds Message.

*Dec. 3 A 7017 25640 Tokyo 867 Washington burn all codes except

one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and

"L" (LA). Stop using the code

machine and destroy it com-

pletely when you have finished

this, wire back "HARUNA."

Destroy all messages files and

other secret documents. (Dec. 2,

1941.)

#Dec. 4 A 7029 25694 Tokyo 114 Investigate fleet air bases in

or 111 Hawaii (Nov. 20, 1941-J19.)

#Dec. 5 A 7063 25773 Tokyo 113 Report ships in Pearl Harbor,

Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941 -

J19.)

#Dec. 5 A 7064 25772 Honolulu 224 Spy report. (Nov. 18, 1941)

*Dec. 5 N 7086 25823 Tokyo 122 In the future report even when

there are no (ship) movements

(Nov 29, 1941-J19.)

#Dec. 5 N 7091 25787 Tokyo 2443 London discontinue use of code

machine and dispose of it immed-

iately. (Dec. 1)

JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES

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More From the NAVY Site..............

"This appendix contains seventy-two selected Japanese naval messages intercepted between September and 4 December 1941 by Navy intercept sites at Hawaii, Guam, and Corregidor; these messages were not decoded and translated until September 1945-May 1946."

[not pasting any of these since they were allegedly translated after the attack-norrin]

Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924-1941

///

Even if you only look at the diplomatic messages, ruling out all the other evidence, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to see what's going on.

Here is an interesting piece I just found while looking for the messages.........

"America's very success, in September 1940, in breaking the Japanese diplomatic cipher, code named "Purple," had the ironic effect of distracting attention from where it could have been more profitably focused in the fateful months leading up to Pearl Harbor. The Purple cipher carried the highest-level diplomatic messages of the Japanese Empire; this was intelligence of such remarkable value that it was given the code name magic. The Purple cipher was generated by a complex machine. It used a cascade of rotating switches to encipher every letter of a message in a different key from the last or the next. In one position of the switches the letter A would become G; in the next it would become P. The U.S. Army's code breakers had, in eighteen months of intense effort, deduced the wiring and setup of the machine without ever seeing one, a feat of pure analysis the likes of which had scarcely before been seen. After hastily soldering together telephone switches and relays to produce a replica of the machine, they proceeded to decode the Japanese messages almost as quickly as they arrived."

"On the morning of December 3, 1941, a Purple message came through ordering Japan's embassy in Washington to destroy its code books, and even one of its two vital Purple machines. Frank Rowlett, a senior cryptanalyst of the Army's Signal Intelligence Service, arrived at his office at noon that day from a meeting, plucked this latest magic decrypt from his in-box, and proceeded to read its contents with mounting incredulity. With only a single machine it would obviously be impossible for the embassy to continue its normal flow of business. Colonel Otis Sadtler, who was in charge of distributing the magic decrypts, showed up in Rowlett's office at that moment and began to pepper him with questions. Had the Japanese ever sent anything like this before? Could they be getting ready to change their codes? Perhaps they suspected their current codes had been broken? Then the only possible meaning of this extraordinary message sank in. Sadtler pulled himself to attention. "Rowlett, do you know what this means? It means Japan is about to go to war with the United States!" And, decrypt in hand, Sadtler took off literally running down the corridor of the Munitions Building to alert the head of Army intelligence."


War with Japan

The next piece comes from a person who doesn't believe in foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl.

How can that be?

The author continues...........

"But diplomatic communications are not the place where military orders are delivered. America knew that Japan was going to strike; it did not know where she would strike. To know that would require breaking into the Japanese naval codes, and there was only one catch: Since mid-1939, America had not read a single message in the main Japanese naval code on the same day it had been sent. For most of the period from June 1, 1939, to December 7, 1941, the Navy was working on naval messages that were months, or even over a year, old."

Hmmmm. They knew Japan was going to strike, but they did not know where.

Hmmm, where could it be?????

continued........

So, where could the attack be?

Hmmmm, can't figure out where them pesky Japs are going to attack.

Hey, maybe we could ask the US ambassador to Japan. Of the major US military bases in the Eastern Pacific, Pearl Harbor was closest to Japan, the most vulnerable to air attack and it had the prize of three aircraft carriers in her harbor when the Japanese strike force left port.

U.S. intelligence services had direct access to Japanese coded transmissions, so U.S. officials were well aware that the Japanese were planning something against them—they just did not know precisely what. One man in particular, Admiral Richmond K. Turner, strongly urged that U.S. forces be placed on a higher state of alert, as he was particularly concerned about the U.S. Navy base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. During previous U.S. war games and exercises, Pearl Harbor had proven highly vulnerable to surprise attacks. Although Turner’s advice was considered, only some of his recommendations were implemented.

SparkNotes: World War II (1939–1945): Japan and Pearl Harbor

O.K, so some Admiral guy, pfft, what the hell does he know, was particuarly concerned about Pearl Harbor, the US Ambassador to Japan had warned months earlier of an attack at Pearl, Admiral Richardson destroyed his career because he fought FDR on leaving the fleet vulnerable at Pearl, it was our closest MAJOR base to Japan, the most vulnerable, had the most targets, including a prize of three aircraft carriers is her harbor when the Japanese strike force left Japan, so hmmmmmmmmmm, where could the attack be?

# 1932 - In the Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercises, 152 aircraft carrier planes caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
# 1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise.
# 1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.

Pearl Harbor - Mother of All Conspiracies

Hmmmmmmm, where could the attack be?

/////////////

Actual scans of the McCollum memo

The McCollum Memo: The Smoking Gun of Pearl Harbor

////////

Advance Warning?
The Red Cross Connection

By Daryl S. Borgquist

Naval History, June 1999

Naval History Archive Index - U.S. Naval Institute

/////

In 1973, former Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Adm. J.O. Richardson, Kimmel's predecessor, said that, "the Report of the Roberts Commission was the most unfair, unjust, and deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government Printing Office." Adm. Richardson was only able to say that because on February 21, 1944, 806 days after the attack, Capt. Laurance Safford blew the whistle to Adm. Kimmel about America's success decrypting Japanese codes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

The decrypted codes gave indications of the place of the Pearl Harbor attack, the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the reason for the Pearl Harbor attack, and the deceit plan to cover the Pearl Harbor attack. Kimmel and Short received none of this information even though it was available in Washington, Manila and London. After learning about this, Adm. Kimmel initiated the next eight Pearl Harbor inquiries, and not surprisingly, the only one that accorded him the opportunity to defend himself -- the Naval Court of Inquiry -- exonerated him.

Congress passed a law in 2000 recommending that this administration advance Kimmel and Short on the retired list. To date, the administration has not done so, and refuses to release requested information explaining why.

http://usa.mediamonitors.net/headlin...f_national_com mission

////////

The Navy Court of Inquiry, met between 20 July 1944 and 20 October 1944. The net result of the Courts inquiry is the complete exoneration of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel while serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet on 7 December 1941. We single out for special mention this portion of the Opinion.

Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, he did not transmit immediately information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. [10]

On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor (review)

/////////

Admiral Richardson lost his job because he dared to argue against FDR's wish to station the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. Why would he risk his career like that?

For a great piece on Admiral Richardson, see..................

http://www.usna.com/classes/1942/UDT4.htm

Besides being a non-deterrent, he reasoned, the Fleet was geographically vulnerable, 2,000 miles closer to the potential enemy. Throughout 1940, he sent numerous letters and dispatches to Washington pointing out the flaws in Fleet combat readiness and requesting the resources to rectify them. He emphasized them all to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox during the latter's visit to Hawaii....all to no avail.



Then he made two trips to Washington to apprise President Roosevelt of the situation and seek his intercession to bring the fleet up to fighting trim or, failing that, return it to its West Coast, less vulnerable bases. Roosevelt did neither.



Political considerations dominated Roosevelt’s thinking. He clung to the illusion that keeping the Fleet in Hawaii would discourage Japanese aggression. Moreover, it was election year and he was more interested in his political image as a peace guarantor than in preparing the nation for self defense.



When his second eye-to-eye appeal to Roosevelt was rebuffed, Oct. 7, 1940, Richardson tried to shock the president by telling him bluntly that the senior officers of the Navy did not have the trust and confidence in their civilian leadership for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific. Roosevelt was shocked all right, but he did not change his policies. Instead, he changed the command of the Fleet to a new incumbent, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and history recorded the results.



In its reporting of the incident, L1FE magazine referred to the relieved commander as "Burly Admiral Richardson." A dictionary defines "burly" as "rough, bulky and bluff." That was not the Richardson I knew. Big he was, but courtly and courteous....a true Texas gentleman of the old school. He was a God-fearing man of high moral principles. He lived by a motto given him by his Stepmother when he left Texas for the Naval Academy: '`The wise man seeks to outshine himself. The fool seeks to outshine others."



Despite the humiliating ignominy of his firing, and the belated vindication of his assessment of the pre-Pearl Harbor situation, he maintained a stoic silence in public on the issues swirling around the turbulent years of World War II and beyond, never criticizing Roosevelt or any of the other key players in the drama. He burned his diary because he feared he had recorded some observations that, if published, might hurt others. Only when he was terminally ill did he authorize the publication of his memoirs.

////////

In the first part of 1941, joint military staff conferences took place between the Americans, British, Canadians, and the Dutch to develop plans for global war against the Axis, although the U.S. was not yet a belligerent. Of greatest importance for the Pacific theater was a meeting in Singapore in April 1941 between the Americans, British, and Dutch. Out of this meeting came the ADB (sometimes called ABCD because of the Canadian involvement in the other meetings) agreement, which committed the conferees to joint action to fight Japan if Japanese forces crossed a geographic line that approximated the northerly extremity of the Dutch East Indies. War would result if Japan invaded British or Dutch territories in Southern Asia or moved into neutral Thailand. In essence, Roosevelt had committed the U.S. to war even if American territory were not attacked. And he had committed the U.S. to war even if the Japanese did not fire the first shot. Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon try to argue that the ADB agreement did not actually commit the U.S. to make war but only "outlined the military strategy to be followed if the U.S. joined the conflict."12 This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that central to the ADB agreement was the criterion for joining the conflict--the Japanese crossing of a particular geographical line. Even one of the early defenders of the Roosevelt administration, Herbert Feis, acknowledged this significance in his history: "Had not the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, this line would have become the boundary between war and peace."13

A secret memo General MacArthur received in September 1941 underscored the offensive purposes that American forces would undertake. It read

commence operation as soon as possible, concentrating on propaganda, terrorism, and sabotage of Japanese communications and military installations . . . Assassination of individual Japanese should also be considered. Prepare to defeat Japan without suffering grievous loss ourselves. . . We must base mobile forces as near to Japan as is practicable. . . To the west there is China where air bases are already being prepared and stocked. . . . to the south there is Luzon in the Philippine Islands, within easy air range of Hainan, Formosa, and Canton, and extreme range of southern Japan. . . Development of further air bases is proceeding.17

TOQ-Stephen J. Sniegoski-Pearl Harbor-Vol 1 No 2

/////////

On 23 June 1941 - one day after Hitler's attack on Russia - Secretary of the Interior and FDR's Advisor Harold Ickes wrote a memo for the President in which he pointed out that "there might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia."

On 18 October Ickes noted in his diary: "For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan."

The U.S. had cracked key Japanese codes before the attack. FDR received "raw" translations of all key messages. On 24 September 1941 Washington deciphered a message from the Naval Intelligence HQ in Tokyo to Japan's consul general in Honolulu, requesting grid of exact locations of U.S. Navy ships in the harbor. Commanders in Hawaii were not warned.

Sixty years later the U.S. Government still refuses to identify or declassify many pre-attack decrypts on the grounds of "national security."

On November 25 Secretary of War Stimson wrote in his diary that FDR said an attack was likely within days, and asked "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." On November 25 FDR received a "positive war warning" from Churchill that the Japanese would strike against America at the end of the first week in December. This warning caused the President to do an abrupt about-face on plans for a time-buying modus vivendi with Japan and it resulted in Secretary of State Hull's deliberately provocative ultimatum of 26 November 1941 that guaranteed war.

On November 26 Washington ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington, out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as possible". This order included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection. On the same day Cordell Hull issued his ultimatum demanding full Japanese withdrawal from Indochina and all China. U.S. Ambassador to Japan called this "The document that touched the button that started the war."

TRUE DEMOCRACY Fall 2001

////////

I leave you with one last piece for your consideration........

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy
Charles Lutton

Pearl Harbor -- Fifty Years of Controversy

Indeed, there is extremely confident understanding that Pearl Harbor was a conspiracy from the president's office - with the purpose to enter the European war. This understanding comes from a big number of documents available in many different countries. Wrong men were accused again.

What is surprising is that the war strategy (PNAC 2000) of the neocon hawks call a new P Harbor in order to speed up the US occupation of the M East oil countries. And this was what we saw in 911 - and the response was exactly what was wanted in the PNAC. And many innocent experts were kicked out as they wanted to interfere the conspiracy (e.g. in FBI and CIA). In the Able Danger program all was well undersood long before.

Why the American people do not want to start discussions about 911 even if those who organized the show are well known? Because tha Americans actually but secretly want aggressive US international policy and dominance in the world in order to have a firm grip from the rest of the oil reserves of the world. This is very sad.

Again, the "high scientist" doesn't read his own sources.

The report you cited as authoritative concludes that your conspiracy theory is nonsense.

Yet you keep making a fool of yourself repeating it. Remarkable.

__________________
De duobus malis, minus est semper eligendum

WHo are you talking too?

Analyst, our resident self-described "high scientist", keeper of super-top-secret documents to which only he and his fellow legendary scientists are privy to.

Matt

__________________
De duobus malis, minus est semper eligendum

What documents are you referring to, maybe I can help.

I can find any public documents available on the web.

Analyst, our "speedy occupation of Middle East Oil Countries" is proceeding too slowly. What is the reason? Why has our grand conspiracy failed to result in our annexing of Saudi Arabia already?

__________________

Don't startle him, Joe - it's almost full!

There are few reasons for the slow progress of USA in stealing the oil resources of ME. USA failed to win Iran when Saddam was put to power and ordered to attack Iran 1980. Actually, US Congress and people were against US participation to that war and the war was therefore lost. Also the Gulf war was a failure ... there was a good start, but the genocide was not planned to the end and to Iran - and Americans were ashamed and stopped. Therefore the neocon hawks decided then that the next time they try to destroy Iran, they MUST have people's support (as Roosevelt wanted support to the European war 1941 - and organized P Harbor) - Bush organized 911 for the same reason. Again the hawks were afraid of attacking Iran - and they decided to destroy Afghanistan and Iraq first and continue from there to Iran later. But again, the Americans were afraid of the massive genocide and use of nuclear and other WMD weapons.

Now also US military experts opposed Bush hawks. They leaked top secret conspiracy news to media and destroyed the strategy of Bush. The generals leaked that the intention is to sink US carrier Enterprise by purpose. Purpose was to accuse that Iranians did that by their missile and to start to yell that "the American people, religion and freedom has been attacked by devils - let's roll to Iran". Then the purpose of transporting nuclear missiles to M East from USA by a B52 was leaked August 2007 and this had to be cancelled. Again the US intelligence published without any permission from Bush that there are no any reason to attack Iran as they don't have any plans for nuclear weapons. And again, the US generals published in media that they will oppose and refuse if ordered to attack Iran.

Thus, the catastrophe is here - the neocon hawks have invested billions to future wars, but the Americans are destroying their plans all the time. The war in Afghanistan and Iraq are nice for the oil and military industrial complex owned by the hawks, but they do not lead to further success. The biggest problem in USA is that there is still remnants of democracy disturbing the international policy implementation. In the foreign countries where US-CIA keep order, there is no democracy but military dictatorship and therefore everything can be ordered to happen ... there is no a common discussion what to do. Hitler also understood the same thing what the US hawks have found out - democracy is a barrier to successfull politics. Therefore Bush has made hundreds of new laws to adopt a German SS Gestapo system.

I am sure that you will be happy later whenever the hawks will find a solution for the problems mentioned above. As the Americans say - the oil resources of the world belong to the Americans who are the best to exhaust and waste these resources.

No, our friend Analyst has access to special documents that cannot be accessed on the internet.

Or so he has claimed.

Frankly, I think this is a fabrication, just like 90% of the other stuff he posts.

Matt

__________________
De duobus malis, minus est semper eligendum

Saudi Arabia will be last on the list, after all, they honor their oil contracts. You can be sure of one thing, if and when we ever turn our sights to Saudi Arabia, we will have ALL OF OUR DUCKS IN A ROW.

There are two holy cities in Saudi Arabia and if we invaded there, we would turn even peaceful Muslims against us.

Do not fear however, the people who are running things are patient. Heck, those who started current foreign policy are not even alive anymore. Most of these scumbags know that they will not see the result of their hard work in their lifetime.

Patient they are.

Well, I posted some information to support my claim, but now no one will respond. I guess it is too much reading.

I see this all the time. People ask me to prove what I say, then after I spend an hour, or more gathering all the evidence, the posters are too flipping lazy to even read the evidence.

No, why bother reading evidence when you can just let the fucking establishment tell you what to think.

God I am sick of sheeple.

And some may say, "God, I am sick of folks who make false assumptions". Let's imagine if there are other possible assumptions: Posters are on vacation; posters are busy with family; posters are busy with work; posters haven't internet access where they are during the time period; posters read it and haven't yet formed an opinion, etc.

But, impatience can cause one to fill a vacuum with incorrect assumptions about others. It's an emotional thing.

__________________
I am an American. That's the way most of us put it, just matter of factly. They are plain words, those four: you could write them on your thumbnail, or sweep them clear across this bright autumn sky. But remember too, that they are more than just words. They are a way of life. So whenever you speak them; speak them firmly, speak them proudly, speak them gratefully. I am an American. ...a tradition