Dil, it just seems that you (and others) are quick to dismiss what authorities DO have to say on these matters, as they are likely just "liberal, effete academics."

And if you're bothering to spend all this time posting & reading here, why not just read Nemo's link? You MIGHT learn something. . .

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"The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither breaks my leg, nor picks my pocket."

Thomas Jefferson

Let me try to explain my previous posts in response to the above criticisms.

The difficulty is that we are learning that the world and things are not as we perceive them. The cited article that reprinted Korzybski’s first paper (which Dilettante criticized without reading as “nihilistic rot” in Post# 73) exposed the problems of our perceptions, which is a fault of language; and, more particularly, identity (viz. the meaning of words used to label things). In brief, language is the symbolic representation by which the mind interprets sensual perception. Language acts as the synapse, metaphorically speaking, through which we make sense of external stimuli. In this sense, language is critical to thinking; for without language, we have no means of distinguishing what our senses perceive. Count Korzybski, however, proposed a new, and highly original (“non-Aristotelian”) approach to semantics, advancing the theory that language directly affects our consciousness and can change our perception of the world. Korzybski observed that removal of the verb form “to be” from language avoids the problems associated with identity which is structurally false to fact, and, if not checked intelligently, becomes a pernicious semantic reaction. See Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity, An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics (1933). His famous remark that “a map is not the territory” illustrates this point; however he also said that a map (and language) is “self-reflexive”; and, consequently, what may not be reflected in the schema, would nevertheless be part of the semantic reaction, albeit at another level of abstraction. Korzybski’s works are very influential, and serve as the basis of Gestalt psychotherapy theory.

I suppose it is too much to ask at the level these discussion forums for one to cite the authorities for one’s arguments. Certainly, Korzybski would be very difficult reading, even in summary; however it should not be dismissed without a fair hearing.

Well, I do apologize, Mark, if I've dismissed (or blindly embraced) any argument based merely on my view of the person who thought it up. That would indeed be an inappropriate response, and not one I'd like to be known as giving.

My desire is seperate the argument from the person who made in order to let the argument stand on its own. Thus, one would neither dismiss an argument out-of-hand merely because it was given by "some liberal academic" nor take the validity of an argument for granted because it was given by "an authority in the field".

But again, if I've wavered from this course it was a clear error on my part.

Not divinity, no. But it seems to me that, assuming cause-and-effect actually works, all phenomena must have either a cause that is natural (meaning the result of accepted physical laws acting on matter and energy) or a cause that is not natural (i.e. "super-natural", meaning something other than matter or energy).
If a phenomena cannot be explained via natural means, then there are two possible conclusions we could reach: 1) We have not yet discovered all natural explinations and this phenomena will be naturally explained if/when we do, or 2) the explination involves more than nature and thus involves the super-natural.
Our unexplainable event might be called evidence for the validity of these two conclusions. And I can't see how either is inherrently more logical than the other. Surely the open-minded person would accept that this phenomena is explained by (and naturally leads one toward) both of these conclusions.

(It is, I should note, my opinion that anyone whose job it is to expand our natural explinations {i.e. "scientists"} should, with regards to their work, always assume conclusion 1 and press on to try to find a natural explination.)

Oh, not at all. If I may continue using "natural" to mean relating to energy/matter and the physical laws that effect it, natural events are explained in light of natural evidence. Super-natural events, by definition, would not be explained in light of natural evidence. At best, they may be suspected in the shadows of natural evidence; when the natural explination fails us, we know that either we should have an expanded explination or expand our consideration beyond nature.
I hasten to emphasize they such things prove nothing. But for now we aren't looking for proof or any conclusive findings, but just there merest bit of evidence.


To answer the immediate question, yes, I'm aware that that isn't quite how it works; such a thing would marginalize both the method and the myth.

But surely you're not saying that we should disregard any testimony that doesn't present clear physical evidence? That would eliminate most of our details about human history (and individually, most of knowledge about things in general).


I can agree with that. But we should recognize that the decision of whether or not a given thing "points toward or away from" a given explination is quite subjective.

Suggestions? Well, I'll try a few, none of which I have personally observed. But my point isn't to ask whether or not these things have ever happened, but ask, if they did, would they count as evidence of the divine (or, at least, of the super-natural)? If evidence is possible, then we can see whether or not any actually exists.

Suggestion 1: An enormous glowing hand appears simultaneously high in the sky over downtown London, New York, Tokyo, and Moscow, extends an index finger, and writes flaming letters in the sky that read "I AM GOD. I EXIST!" The hand then vanishes, but the letters remain for some hours before fading away. No physical explinations are validated as yet. Evidence for God?

Suggestion 2: A man pops up claiming to be the human avatar of God and to have divine powers and knowledge. He proceeds to demonstrate by turning the Atlantic Ocean into blood and back again at will, defying gravity, walking through walls, and curing cancer with a touch. He also makes perfectally accurate predictions about the future and the present, not only telling you what number you're thinking of, but also predicting die rolls advance and immediately answering whether or not any number (no matter how large) is prime. Scientists are unable to explain either the physical phenomema or the man's knowledge. Once the computer tests finish, it is proved that he was always correct about the prime numbers, including several that were not previously discovered. Evidence of God?

Suggestion 3: A document is found and firmly dated to between 2000 and 1500 BC. After being translated, it turns out to a diary of a man claiming to have spoken with angels who told him a story from God about the future. The story, which is included, turns out to be an astonishingly accurate history of the Roman Empire, including reference to a previously unknown Imperial tomb outside Constantinople. Archeologists search for and find the tomb precisely where indicated; they conclude it was not created until around 100 AD. Evidence of God?

If these can count as evidence (not conclusive evidence, mind you, perhaps not even persuasive evidence) then maybe we can examine whether any actually recorded observations might as well. But if you feel that even such events as these would not even "point toward" the existence of divinity, then I don't know what else to say. In that case it would appear that your mind was already made up.

No. Things are not necessarily ordered in Aristotelian terms of cause and effect. Again, it is a fallacy in our perception, which was first observed by David Hume when he wrote:

“But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the object Cause; the other, Effect. We suppose that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainly and strongest necessity.
“It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing further is the case.”
- David Hume, Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (1777)

Following up Hume’s observation, Alfred Korzybski (as Einstein and Heisenberg theorized in physics and quantum mechanics) carried it one step further:

“We ‘feel,’ and try to ‘think,’ about ‘cause and effect’ as contiguous in ‘time.’ But ‘contiguous in time’ involves the impossible ‘infinitesimal’ of some unit of ‘time.’ But, since we have seen that there is no such thing we must accept that the interval between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ is finite. This structural fact changes the whole situation. If the interval between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ is finite, then always something might happen between, no matter how small the interval may be. The ‘same cause’ would not produce the ‘same effect.’ The expected result would not follow. This means only that in this world, to be sure of some expected effect requires that there must be nothing in the environment which can interfere with the process of passing from conditions labelled ‘cause’ to the condition labelled ‘effect.’ In this world, with the structure which it has, we can never suppose that a ‘cause,’ as we know it is alone sufficient to produce the supposed ‘effect.’ When we consider the ever-changing environment, the number of possibilities increases enormously. If it were possible to take account the whole of the environment, the probability that some event would be repeated, in all details, thus exhibiting the assumed two-valued relation of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ which we took for granted in the old days, would practically be nil.”
- Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity, An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics (1933)

The problem - to put it simply - is that our presumption (viz. that what we perceive to be is real) may not be true. A presumption is not evidence, much less proof of the fact.

I can completely agree with that.
All our preceptions may indeed be false and we have no objective way to prove they are not. The very notion of cause-and-effect may be wrong.

But, having admitted that, it doesn't seem to be a very useful truth. We must either assume that our perceptions (taken as a whole) are accurate or we must abandon all knowledge entirely.
Similarly, we must assume that cause-and-effect does work in order for science to function.

My comments above acted under the presumptions that perceptions represent reality and cause-and-effect does work. These presumptions are indeed unprovable, but without them it seems to me that no knowledge can exist.


On a seperate issue, Nemo, I apologize for abrasiveness of my post #73. The tone there provided nothing useful to the content and added only animosity to the discussion. That is not the style I desire for my posts and I'm sorry that one was so lacking in civility.

There's nothing wrong with operating on the basis of an educated assumption for the purpose of expanding knowledge. It's when we take these assumptions to be absolute truths that we very quickly get into trouble.

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Who does vote for these dishonest shitheads? Who among us can be happy and proud of having all this innocent blood on our hands? Who are these swine? These flag-sucking half-wits who get fleeced and fooled by stupid little rich kids like George Bush?

--Hunter S. Thompson

Let me introduce you to a little group called the KKK...

And another one called the Nazi Party...

The difficulty with arguing religious subjects (e.g., whether God is the cause of all things) is that it requires one to accept as true for the initial premise (i.e., that God exists) what is not susceptible of proof. Such argument, petitio principii, merely begs the question; and, ineluctably, leads to false (even absurd) conclusions. It is a perversion of Aristotelian logic. Spinoza’s Ethics provides an example:

“We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their theory - namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof on to some one's head and kills him, they will demonstrate by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man; for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent circumstances) have all happened together by chance? Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. ‘But why,’ they will insist, ‘was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very time walking that way?’ If you again answer, that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will again insist: ‘But why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?’ So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at last you take refuge in the will of God - in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance.”
- Benedictus (Baruch) de Spinoza, The Ethics, Part I, “Concerning God,” Appendix (1677)