Lately I've been mulling over a particular line of thought about awareness and consciousness and such and I thought some people here might want to discuss it. I haven't really worked it out yet, but I'm hoping I can flesh it out some in discussion.
Anyway, here goes:



In reading some threads about cloning, I started wondering just what it was that made me, as a whole person, distinct from my clone. Obviously not my DNA, but I could think of a whole host of other differences so it turned out not be a very interesting question.

But then I thought, what if we eliminated as many of those trivial differences as possible without changing the fundamental nature of the question?
What if we imagine that we could somehow make someone who was truly identical to me. Say we had something like a Star Trek replicator that could analyze me on an molecular (or even atomic) level and instantly create an duplicate, physically identical in every way except located half a meter to my left.
So my (for lack of a better word) "replicant" not only has my DNA, but also all the scars and marks left on me by my experiences. Every memory stored in my mental configuration is stored in his, and so forth....you get the idea.
What would make me distinct from this replicant?

Now, one approach I thought of would simply point out that I was made of one set of matter and he was made of another, thus a distinction. Also, I occupy a set volume of space distinct from that which he occupies.
And that's well and good, but it poses something of a problem. First off, I know that the set of matter that makes up my physical form is constantly changing. Some atoms are added, others of lost. I doubt that very many of the atoms I had when I was five are still with me and I have since acquired a good many more. If I were to have some sort of organ replacement I could vastly speed up this process of changing out my material substance, yet I wouldn't consider the post-op me a distinct person from the pre-op me. In short, my identity as a person is not tied to a set group of atoms.
And regarding distinction by location, I've noticed that I tend to move about, first occupying one volume of space and then occupying another, and in general I don't think that the "me" sitting here on the couch is distinct from the "me" who was in the kitchen ten minutes ago. Thus, my identity as a person is not tied to a set volume of space.
So the fact that my replicant is made of a different set of atoms and happens to be over there instead of over here isn't really enough to make him a distinct person.
So what does make us different people?


Now before you answer, let me add one thing to the scenario for your consideration. Let's say a group of my friends and family were standing around watching the replication procedure. So they saw me go into the booth and get scanned and then they saw the replicant materialize half a meter away.
Now suppose I say (for some odd reason), "I had a strawberry birthday cake when I was ten years old." Those who were there for that occasion might say, "Yes you did, I remember it."
Now the replicant, who shares all my memories and thus thinks he's me as much as I do, might say "I had a strawberry birthday cake when I was ten years old." To which the observers might reply, "No you didn't. You just think you did because you have Dilettante's memories."

But on what basis do they say that I was there and the replicant wasn't? We have already established that, in all likelihood, very few of my current set of atoms were present for that party, so as a collection of matter, I wasn't there any more than he was.
What is this "I" that was there? And why am I it and he not?

Any thoughts?

This is actually a tricky question, and people might be interested to find that in all likleyhood NONE of the atoms you were born of are still within your body. Our bodies recycle all the atoms that we are made of, but the organization of them are what make a person "who" they are. Let me also say that there is NO scientific evidence for dualism, a mind/body split. Your mind does not exist without your physical brain.


I would then argue that IF this exact physical replication were possible then you would "both" be the same "you". However, as of now we don't think that kind of thing is physically possible.

What's your source for this?

__________________
When they come a wull staun ma groon
Staun ma groon al nae be afraid
Thoughts awe hame tak awa ma fear
Sweat an bluid hide ma veil awe tears

There are numerous sci-fi stories on this idea.

"The Simultaneous Man", Ralph Blum was one. In this case the process of formation had an impact on the uniqueness of the resulting individuals. The process involved wiping the memories of subject A and supplanting them with those of subject B. Severe psychological trauma resulted when subject A could not reconcile the memories of a white person in his black body. This fictional experiment is something of a control in the replicator scenario - body constant, mind duplicated. The mind just isn't enough and even in cases where the body differences are not so gross as in the black-white duality we can expect trauma (overcome or otherwise) to have a lasting effect on the duplicate mind thus altering it into a unique individual.

What if the differences in the body were miniscule but the mind were the same? As the two individuals drew their first breathe after replication would the mind know at a deep subconscious level that it is indeed a unique individual? I think so, as the so called "butterfly effect" (maybe misplaced here - but I think you get the idea) is rampant within the confines of the human body of which the mind is inseperable. Hence the replicant on drawing breathe, or feeling it's first radiation input could claim complete and absolute individuality.

But this ignores one glaring flaw in the reasoning. Imagine if you will the shock of suddenly finding yourself transported a half metre from where you just stood and seeing "yourself" standing right where you were just a moment ago. Even if you knew this was going to happen it would still be a momentous experience. But the event only happened to one individual - the replica and that unique experience is extremely significant. It is such a dramatic experience that the replica can say - yes indeed for a brief moment I was a replica but experiencing what I just did makes me forever unique and a replica no longer.

So how to overcome this and get a true replica? Replicate a person without their knowledge while they are asleep - they'll still occupy a different space and will very quickly collide in conflict. If the conflict were to occur in a isolated padded cell the outcome will be determined by only the physical positioning of the two individuals at replication - one position giving the other a different starting point with chance ruling from there.

Let's place the original in a padded cell and make the replica in an identical cell. If we can replicate a human, we can replicate the exact conditions in a padded cell right? Wrong, the cell must also exist in the world of probabilities and fluctuations in power, air quality, gravity, electromagnetic fields etc. will have a albeit small but significant impact on the two seperate and inescapably different environments. We are talking of atomic duplication and some of these effects are very pronounced on atomic structures - change those - you change the individual. And since we have the technology to replicate you can be sure we have the technology to detect the atomic difference in the two individuals. Given that knowledge the replica could order the equivalent of todays DNA paternity test and put their mind at rest once and for all that they are unique.

OK so we get through the first 5 mins after replication and now it's time to go home to the wife in my car. Now we have a legal problem - who is married and who owns? Not a problem after we get over the typical slowness of the legal system to recognise new situations that science conjures. We legislate that the replica - proven by our "DNA like" test has no right to the property and wife. That's mighty harsh! But what kind of person would want to do that to "himself/herself"? So you'd have to be a poorly informed at best to undergo replication and it would have to be illegal and done only for deceptive purposes unless there was another way .....

Why replicate? Because we can? - that soon wears thin. To commit a crime and have an alibi - like obtaining an unlicenced gun. Get more work/play done - now we have to share the rewards. Build a slave force of individuals with a certain talent otherwise difficult to obtain - it might work if you duplicate the whole society ... which extends to the entire planet. But, then we come to immortality. There would be no problem willing property to a replica but it might be a bit freaky for an eighty year old wife to get her 30 year old husband back. Imagine refreshing your 20 yo wife/husband every time she/he turns 40! It might be manageable for the well informed with well structured contracts but it's a whole new legal industry right there. See "The Prestige" to a get a feel for this.

To find the self you need to dig deeper into the physics. The exact replication is not possible other than as a remotely possible random event even when the random event is generated from a replicator machine. Given that random event creating for an instant a true replica, more random and more likely events following very soon after will individualise the replica and the original.

So what does this do to the second part of the question?
Both I and the replicant make a statement about being at my tenth birthday party. If we are both "me" then surely that statement is equally true (or false) for both of us. Yet, the record clearly shows that only one Dilettante was, in fact, present at that event. So how it both statements be true?

As I see it, your replicant is you just as much as you are you. You will slowly differentiate in the future to become two different persons. But right after the replication process, killing one of you wouldn't really be a murder. There's only two instances of just one person, not two persons (yet). It would be teleportation.
I don't think the statements are contradictory... I mean, nothing seems wrong to me there. Both are Dilettante, both can claim that they were there, but back then they were "melted" into one.

__________________
Client: In six days, do you hear me, six days, God made the world. And you are not bloody well capable of making me a pair of trousers in three months!
Tailor: But my dear Sir, my dear Sir, look at the world, and look at my trousers.
(Beckett)

They replica is only exact for a humanly indescernable amount of time.

I'm not quite sure I see how it wouldn't be murder just because there's another one of "me" out there too.

But what would this means about past events tied to "me", I wonder. Would my replicant (or replicantS, lets say I made a squadron of them, creating a new on once a month for a year) all be equally married to my wife along with me?
Would they equally own all the stuff I had acquired prior to their replication?
Would they be equally guilty of any crimes I had committed prior to their replication? And, as a follow up on that one, in order for "justice to be done", would it be required that all of them be punished or would the punishment of just one do?

And finally, just because I'm spewing forth a bunch of questions here, which similarities between me and the replicants really bring up all these questions? Would the dilemma be any less if they were identical in personality and memory but somehow distinct in physical built and appearance?

I would say Dil that part of the distinction between your clone and you would be others relationship to you. Your parents gave birth to you, not the clone. Your friends have stories and memories with you, not the clone. Your wife (I don't know if you have one) is married to you, not the clone. The clone has one sided memories. He can remember doing things with other people, but know one with him per se. Also I would make the distinction between remembering and doing. While both you and your clone remember the same events only your friends, family, wife also remember you doing them. You actually accomplished all the important areas in life where as your clone remembers you doing them.

__________________
"A dog barks when his master is attacked. I would be a coward if I saw that God's truth is attacked and yet would remain silent."
-John Calvin

Well, remember, we're not really talking "clones" per se', since a clone obviously has its own history distinct from yours. We're talking a "replicant" an atomically exact copy made at some point in time; prior to that point the replicant had no history (or had the exact same history you did, depending on how you look at it).

But I think you're right on the issue that interests me. Look at these statements:
"Your parents gave birth to you..."
"Your friends have stories and memories with you..."
"Your wife (I don't know if you have one) is married to you..."
"You actually accomplished all the important areas in life..."
Now I agree that they are all true. But I'm trying to figure out what precisely is meant by "you" in all these cases.
In what sense was did my parents give birth to "me"? Or, to put it another way, what aspect(s) of "me" did they give birth to that are present now? Are any of these aspects not equally present in my replicant?

You would be different because of your experiences.

Now if this "replicator" somehow also replicated all memory, then you would be the same...having said that, I don't see what you argument is, or of what value.

There being no soul ....

Even if we replicated the quantum numbers of each sub-atomic particle there would only be two "yous" for the very briefest of times. The first change will occur as soon as any radiation or other particle interacts with your own. This would be virtually instantaneously.

The original you will emerge knowing that it is actually a replica and indeed unique. If we had such technology we could measure the differences. You would hope a voluntary replicant would have all the life complications that the actions he undertook sorted out before hand.

A forced replications would be criminalised or a product of a very different society indeed. Although not the same as replication you might produce similar conditions found in the inhabitants of "Dark City".

This tells us that there is no "you" just an ego. A mere perception of a you. You have every right to it as it is an essential component of individual and species survival.

Well, since the assumption is that the "replicator" creates a precisely exact physical copy, if memory solely attributable to the physical state of my brain then my replicant's brain (which is presumable in precisely the same physical state) must have the same memories, right?

But what do you mean by "the same"? "Same" can mean identical but distinct (as in, "All cans of coke are basically the same.") or it can mean a shared identity (as in, "Bobby and Mr. Smith are the same person: Bob Smith").
So when we say the I and my replicant are the "same". Do we mean that the replicant is "Just like me" or that the replicant "Is me"?
If the former, what precisely is "me" referring to?
If the latter, then I will object because it is plain to me that the replicant is distinct, if only b/c I experience my sensations but I do not experience his.


EDITED:
Oh. And it isn't really much of an argument or anything of immense value. I'm just trying to think it through because it interests me

You would only be the same for an extremely small moment.
At which point you would be different both physically and mentally.