A Method to the Madness: Venezuelan Foreign Policy under Chavez

Abstract
Hugo Chavez Frias is the charismatic president of Venezuela, and the self styled revolutionary leader of a neo-socialist movement in Latin America. His foreign policy actions seem, at times, to be nonsensical, but when examined on a systematic basis, they reflect a rational, calculated execution of an ideological philosophy. What this philosophy does is blend devotion to a radical ideology with a precise pragmatism.

Introduction
In this paper I will address the question of Venezuela’s grand strategy under the governance of Hugo Chavez. My thesis question is hat motivates Venezuela to act in the way that it does? On what ideological, or practical basis are decisions made? It is necessary to determine the rational explanation for the seemingly irrational and contradictory actions that Chavez makes as the president of Venezuela. This paper will approach the issue with the thesis that there is a logical reason for any action that Chavez makes, and will try to determine what that reason or reasons might be. Under his leadership, Venezuela has been spontaneous, determined, loud, and at times, patently absurd. Often Chavez appears to guide Venezuela with an opportunistic political instinct, but at times seems to be a naïve and inept blundering dramatist posturing as a statesman. Given the enormous oil resources that Venezuela possesses, Chavez has a potentially powerful bargaining chip for achieving his interests. But what these interests? It is unclear what Chavez’s ultimate goal is when he sidles up to world leaders so ideologically opposed to him as Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, president of Iran. The obvious answer is that they are both radically anti-American, or at least radically opposed to the US administration of George W. Bush. But that begets another question: what does Chavez have to gain from going head to head with unequivocally the most powerful player in the international field?
From an academic perspective, the reason that this sort of research is important is the rapidly changing status of various countries around the world. As the economic hegemony of the United States is challenged by several states, the emerging powers seem not to be compatible with previous theories explaining and predicting international behaviour. Models that academics use to analyze countries are generally designed for either a bipolar or hegemonic international system, specifically that of international idealism or realism. With the increasing multipolarity of the world, it is necessary to attempt to tailor old theories from strictly realist, or idealist, to fit the new polarity, or determine whether the time has come to throw out outdated theories and determine a new way of looking at the international system. Alternatively, one might attempt to take selected features from theories and combine them to create an amalgamated model with which to view countries. To further determine the grand strategy of Venezuela, it is necessary to understand exactly what influences Venezuelan policy. Hence, a levels of analysis based examination is also in order, to determine what factors, system, state, or individual (or whatever blend of these three) go into creation of policy.
Practically, there is plenty of legitimacy in examining Venezuela. They are a major exporter of oil, and the Chavez government appears to have increasing influence over others around the globe, such as the president of Peru, Evo Morales, who seems to tailor his policy to that of Chavez. Subsequently, it is in the interests for anyone remotely affected by the evolving world to understand, and to have a means of evaluating the behaviour of developing states such as Venezuela and by world leaders such as Chavez.
Literature Review
Unfortunately, there is not a plethora of literature concerning the foreign policy of Venezuelan under Chavez. He is the darling of the sensation-driven media, especially given his absurdist antics, but there is little of gravitas written about him. In “Breaking the Mold” Venezuela’s defiance of the Neoliberal Agenda,” Sheila D. Collins discusses Chavez’s leading of an anti-neoliberal movement in Latin America. This article gives an extensive review of Chavez’s economic and political ideology and motivation. She details his rise to power and his reforms that, while anti-neoliberal, are not the traditional leftist strongman tactics. She claims that the American media has a skewed view of Chavez and that Venezuela is much more open and “free” than the media acknowledges (Collins 383). With the media as a source anti-Chavism in the United States there is a general misconception of the reality of Venezuela. Collins accuses anti-Castro Cubans in the US State Department for orchestrating the anti-Castro foreign policy. She cites Chavez’s refusal of aid from the United States during 1999 as the first “act of defiance” against the United States. Collins portrays Chavez’s decision as a refusal of military intrusion into Venezuela. This action set the tone for the Chavez presidency to date: “America is not our friend” (Collins 394). While she justifies this particular unfriendly gesture towards the United States, Collins fails to explain the extreme vitriol which Chavez expresses against what he views as an imperialistic war mongering nation, an example of which is Chavez referring to George W. Bush as “the devil” in a General Assembly meeting. She does touch on one very important point, however, by postulating that much of Chavez’s actions are due to his individual character. Is it merely a personal grudge against the United States? Collins does not address this question, but if that is the answer, other factors must be examined as well.
While Chavez certainly wants nothing to do with the United States, except to lambaste them, he is by no means an isolationist. He has reached out to the countries around him, wishing to create a “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas” (ALBA) (Collins 392). This initiative is intended to counter the US-sponsored Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, Collins tells us. Creating economic solidarity in South America, to the exclusion of the United States seems to be one of Chavez’s many ambitious goals. The other countries of Latin America have been increasingly in favour of ALBA as an alternative to the US model, which points towards a growing regional clout wielded by Chavez (Collins 393). However, Chavez is not content merely to exclude the United States; it seems that he has declared an ideological war, evident in his flowery, personal rhetoric.
To fully understand Venezuelan foreign policy it is vital to explore why the relations between Venezuela and the United States have gone so far beyond the normal ideological differences that states find themselves in. The conflict between Chavez and the United States has become quite personal, with high profile personalities, such as the influential televangelist Pat Robertson, who has ties to the Bush administration, in the United States calling for his assassination. (USA Today)
In her book “The Chavez Code” Eva Golinger blames the United States for the escalating the situation by continuing the long standing tradition of Washington meddling with South American affairs. She accuses the US of having a direct hand in the failed coup that attempted to remove Chavez from power in 2002. (Golinger 2) If this is true, then why does Chavez continue to antagonize such a powerful and influential enemy? In his article “Hugo Boss” Javier Corrales makes the claim that Chavez simply acts this way because it “endears him to the international left” (Corrales). The veracity of this argument is questionable, however, because Chavez’s allies in South America, such as Kirchner in Argentina and Lula da Silva in Brazil, are consistently more moderate than him. Further, other countries that Chavez has courted have decidedly right-wing governments, such as Iran, which is headed by the hard-line theocrat Ahmedinejad and Supreme Leader Khamenei. It is worthy to note, however, that these right wing governments are either blatantly anti-US, or at least have less than warm relations with the United States. Western Hemisphere right-wing countries, however, traditionally side with the United States, so Chavez has been less than cordial to countries such as Colombia and Guatemala. Corrales goes on to claim that “trashing the United States is a low-risk, high-return policy for gaining support” for the policies and international initiatives that Chavez pursues. (Corrales) However, subscribing to this argument contradicts Golinger’s argument that Chavez’s anti-US policies are anything but low-risk, as the United States was instrumental in his attempted overthrow, and currently maintains anti-Chavez operations within Venezuela. (Golinger 133) Also, if the returns are so high for cozying up to Anti-American governments, why did Chavez fail to secure a seat for Venezuela on the United Nations Security Council when anti-Americanism is so prevalent around the world? Clearly the aforementioned arguments, from Golinger and Corrales, are incompatible, thus further examination is called for.
In “Why Chavez Wins,” Francisco Rodriguez proposes the idea that Chavez is using his “showboating” foreign policy actions to distract Venezuelans from the dramatic failures of his domestic policies. (Rodriguez) The problem with this assessment, however is that these conclusions are drawn from the same data that Sheila Collins uses to claim that Chavez’s policies are a burgeoning success. While the numbers are the same, the interpretation is entirely subjective. Collins refers to a program to end illiteracy through which the government has claimed to given 1.5 million Venezuelans basic literacy (Collins). Rodriguez, on the other hand, takes the same data and says that the level of education is insufficient and therefore a failure. Similarly, Collins attributes Venezuela’s booming economy in part to Chavez’s policies, whereas Rodriguez claims the economy is doing well despite Chavez. As such, there is no conclusive evidence that Chavez’s showboating foreign policy is designed to distract from failing domestic policy, because there is inconclusive evidence that the domestic policy is, in fact, failing. Thus one must determine if there are not other explanations for the overly dramatic policy that is observed.
A consistent problem with any analysis of issues regarding Venezuela is that, almost universally, most analyses have a biased agenda, usually to either support Chavez, or more often, to discredit him. While these polemics may have various desirable political results, it does little to further our knowledge and understanding of what Chavez’s goals are, what his techniques are, and the implications of them for the future.

Methodology
Because of the polarizing nature of literature regarding Chavez, it is important that an objective analysis be based as much as possible from credible reports and fact rather than rhetoric and opinion. As such, for this paper my main sources will be a variety of news articles regarding Chavez’s international activities. Bearing in mind that the American press is often implicitly hostile towards the Venezuelan president, I will attempt to glean only the actual occurrences, that is to say specific actions: speeches, foreign policy decisions, meetings with other leaders, etc., from the news article, not the opinion of the journalist. By looking primarily at events instead of the subsequent biased analyses of these events, I will be able to remain relatively objective. To further my objectivity I will attempt to draw from a diverse selection of news reporting organizations including The New York Times, The Economist, The Miami Herald, Worldpress.org and Reuters. For a more in depth look at certain areas, I will rely mainly upon the sources discussed in the previous section.
Once a sound base of data is accumulated, it can be plugged into theories of international Realism and Idealism to help determine why Chavez does what he does, and what he plans on doing in the future. Thus, the first determination to make is whether Chavez is a realist, acting only in the benefit of Venezuela, or an idealist, whose actions, such as giving discounted, or even free oil to poor nations, are based purely in ideological altruism. For this purpose, we will use Laura Neak’s discussion on international relations theory, that is, realism and idealism, as a basis for evaluating whether Chavez’s policies are consistent with idealist or realist tenets.
According to Neak, there are two basic tenets of realist theory. First is the negative view of human nature, that humans are essentially selfish creatures. This translates into international theory with the assertion that states are essentially selfish entities. The second is the concept of the international system as an anarchical environment, where states act only in their self interest, and are loath to trust one another. Idealist, or Liberal, theory, on the other hand, approaches the subject with a positive view of human nature, that humans are naturally inclined to cooperate for mutual benefit. As such, it is possible for states to construct a sort of international social construct, either institutionally or implicit, and operate in a cooperative manner. Examining Venezuelan policy under these auspices can help gain an understanding of the construction of this policy.
It is also important to examine Venezuelan policy under Chavez from the levels of analysis. This is important because it shows whence stems policy. The determining factors, system, state, or individual, can greatly change the outcome as far as strategy and goals are concerned. Thus to form a comprehensive view of Venezuela’s grand strategy, a levels of analysis view is in order. For this we will use David Singer’s article “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations.” First we must view Venezuela on the system level: what are Venezuela’s national interests, what pressures does it face from the surrounding world, what advantages and influence does it retain over other countries? Second is the examination of Venezuela from the state level. What are the influences of the media, public opinion, type of political institutions and interest groups? The state level, in Venezuela’s case, ties in very closely with the Individual level. For this level, of course, we examine the character, history, ideology, and personality of Hugo Chavez himself.
Because Chavez has clearly had a great influence directly upon Venezuelan policy, it is important to be especially methodical in our examination on the individual level. As such, “Populism: Archival Concept or 21st Century Reality” by Jonathan Gilbert provides an analysis of Chavez’s singular nature as a populist leader. This article helps to understand Chavez’s nature and ideology.
As stated above, it is probable that no particular theory will adequately explain Chavez’s behaviour. Thus it may be necessary to adapt and dissect different theoretical frameworks to find the most appropriate parts to apply. The final part of the analysis process will be attempting to reconcile Venezuelan foreign policy to a methodological explanation. With this accomplished, I will be able to more accurately determine what precisely Venezuela’s, and Chavez’s goals and interests are.

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"Jesus said: I have cast fire upon the world, and behold I guard it until it is ablaze."
Gospel of Thomas

Continued:

Analysis
By all appearances, Venezuelan foreign policy under Chavez is a dichotomous contradiction between Liberalism and Realism. This implies a different basic theoretical underpinning for Venezuela’s grand strategy. On one hand Chavez seems to be fully in favour of becoming extremely internationalist, cooperating economically with regional neighbours, but also with countries around the world, such as China. Last year Venezuela became a full member in the Latin American trade bloc MERCOSUR (NYT). The bloc is for the purpose of streamlining trade and cooperation between sovereign South American countries, which is clearly a liberal concept. Even more telling, however, is Venezuela’s reaching out to countries that are ethnically and culturally dissimilar to the Latin bloc. Most recently, Venezuela has made overtures to China, especially as a potential export market for Venezuelan oil (BBC). Chavez has also become very close to other world leaders on a personal level: maintaining apparent friendships with neighbours Evo Morales of Bolivia and Fidel Castro of Cuba, as well as Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of Iran. These personal relationships evidence a certain degree of international idealism, as leaders become friends who do each other favours and cooperate, rather merely independent actors working in the specific interest of their own state. Further, Chavez has developed the habit of distributing oil either without charge, or with severely reduced prices, to various regional governments in apparent good will offerings, without apparent stipulations or conditions (The Economist).
On the other hand, Chavez has led Venezuela dramatically in the opposite direction when concerning countries such as the United States of America. Rather than attempting to cooperate with the United States, Chavez has engaged in fiery rhetoric aimed not only at the current administration, but running the gambit from George Washington to George W. Bush. This, however, can also be interpreted as liberalism. When a country takes a stand against another based on rhetorically ideological or moral reasons, it transcends its own definitive interests and operates in the interests of a greater humanity. However, this is only in the case that Venezuela would be better served by approximating itself to the United States. If this were the case, and that is debatable, then Chavez would certainly be operating as a liberal as he places his ideology over Venezuelan state interest.
At the same time, however, as appearing to break away from the traditional realist mode of operation, Venezuelan foreign policy has characteristics that are certainly realist in nature. While Chavez may spew ideological opposition to the United States, he does not apply his ideological values to his relations with other countries: China is becoming increasingly privatized, whereas Venezuela is moving in the opposite direction, and Iran’s theocratic regime has essentially nothing in common with Chavez’s vision for Venezuela. They are being approached merely because they are strategically relevant to Venezuela.
Perhaps a more striking example of Venezuela’s realism lies precisely in its relations with the United States. Despite the river of vitriol towards the United States, even greater is the river of oil that flows from Venezuela into the American economy. The United States is still the largest market for Venezuelan oil exports (The Economist). This “dealing with the devil” is exemplary of the realities of economic necessity superseding the motivations of ideology, and is decidedly realist.
Is Chavez’s Venezuela realist or liberal? The answer is neither, or both. Taking from both schools of thought, Venezuela seems to be practising some form of alternative blend of liberalism and realism: they are pragmatic in their approach to foreign policy, but the interests of Venezuela itself are not necessarily the be all and the end all of their foreign policy goals. Thus Venezuela is idealist in the sense that it pushes an ideology over interest, that is to say, it sacrifices Venezuelan interest in a search for greater regional cooperation and fellowship. However it goes about furthering that ideology by behaving as a realist state.
Determining Venezuela’s views on liberalism and realism, however, are not enough to fully understand Venezuela’s foreign policy. We must also examine the levels of analysis: the system, the state, and, of course, the individual. Without this analysis, trying to determine what Venezuela’s current long range goals are would be futile. David Singer tells us that for the system level of analysis we must examine states as the primary actors, and that their actions will be explained by defining their interests. In the case of Venezuela, this level of analysis fails to explain policy, because it discounts ideologies that motivate various state’s behaviour. Small Caribbean island-states have little to contribute in either resources or strategic positioning for increasing Venezuela’s power. Why then does Venezuela liberally shower these nations with oil? This is something that can only be answered by peeling away the layers and looking at Venezuela from another perspective. The only applicable factor that can be gained from looking at the system level of analysis is some context for the actors. The situation is thus: a relatively small and non-influential country, Venezuela, has a vast supply of a vital commodity, oil. Most of the rest of the system level, both powerful countries and otherwise, can be defined as those in need of this commodity.
When we descend to the state level, we can better understand Venezuelan policy, but again, this level provides mainly a contextual basis for examining the individual of Hugo Chavez. To understand Venezuela’s political culture we need look at the historical aspects. Jonathan Gilbert refers to the pre-Chavez political climate in Venezuela as “a deeply discontent society where severe social disturbances (such as the 1989 caracazo) emerged as a result of the neoliberal economic policies implemented by President Carols Andres Perez, following international financial institutions recommendations.” (Gilbert). Gilbert paints a picture of a population disillusioned with traditional institutions and their methods and ready for an ideological beacon. It is in the context of these conditions that we can evaluate the driving force behind Venezuela’s foreign policy.
Perhaps not since Hitler has the name of a single person been so synonymous and interchangeable with his country. When one thinks of Venezuela one’s mind immediately leaps to the charismatic Hugo Chavez Frias. Chavez is single-handedly responsible for reshaping the political scene in Venezuela. According to Eva Golinger, the people of Venezuela came to appreciate Chavez when he admitted full culpability for the 1992 coup, which failed, and when he served the subsequent time in prison. It was the first the Venezuelans had seen of an individual taking responsibility for his political actions, and immediately regarded him as a relatively credible actor in the political arena. With his election in 1998, Chavez has become one of the most divisive, and renowned figures in global politics. By aggressively pursuing his policies both domestically and abroad, he manages to polarize his own population, as well as whole regions and countries.
Chavez’s domestic policies are rather clear: the desire to further socialism and bring some social justice to the impoverished peoples of Venezuela. His foreign policy ideas, however, are much more radical, and more controversial. His official rhetoric is that he wants to create in South America a revival of what he calls the “Bolivarian Revolution,” named for the South American liberator Simon Bolivar. This revolution involves spreading his ideology of popular socialism throughout South America and the Caribbean. It is apparent, by his actions, that his ideology is more than merely rhetoric. Many criticize his self concentration of power and claim that he is merely power hungry and wishes to become an autocrat. However, Collins asserts that he has made great strides in advancing socialism within Venezuela.
How then, do we know that his desire to extend his “revolution” to the region is sincere? Here is where we return to those aspects of Venezuelan foreign policy that are extremely cooperative: specifically the liberal disbursement of oil and oil revenue, for instance, to the Caribbean islands, or to the Argentine Government to pay foreign debt. Chavez has not asked that the recipient nations consider these boons as anything other than gifts. He is merely building political capital throughout the region. Chavez realizes that to further his goals he will need the cooperation and goodwill of Latin American governments. Increasing trade and opening borders is not merely a matter of mobilizing poor populations: the authority must be involved in such moves.
Chavez has not, however, forgotten his populist roots. Domestically, he continually plays to the fears and dreams of the Venezuelan majority by giving dire threats of United States intervention and flowery rhetoric regarding escaping the poverty-perpetrating neoliberal system (Rodriguez). However, Chavez has not limited himself to populism within his own country: his political savvy has informed him that it is wise, when trying to affect regional change, to have regional popularity. When he travels throughout South America he consistently fills stadiums with thousands of supporters (BBC). Apparently he has observed the spread of populism, in its various forms, throughout Latin America and realizes that popular support from the disparate peoples of the region will translate into support from the leaders that they choose.
In an evaluation of the other presidents in South America, Kirchner, Bachelet, Lula da Silva, Correa, Garcia, and even Morales of Bolivia, there is a consistent trait of being more moderate than Hugo Chavez. Nonetheless, Chavez must be able to count on support from these governments if he wishes to pursue an eventuality resembling his Bolivarian union. This is why Chavez, to a certain degree, circumvents the governments of his neighbours, and appeals directly to their populace (The Economist).
Much of this flies in the face of traditional realist, the selfish pursuit of state interests, and traditional populist ideas. For one thing, Chavez seems to be putting the good of the region ahead of the good of his own people, the Venezuelans. The only rational way to explain this is to allow that Chavez’s political ideology is his main motivation, even above self fulfilment. While Chavez is doing much to centralize power in his own person, and often purports himself as an almost messianic figure, it seems that he considers his cause to be greater than himself. While this is apparent in rhetoric, it is more importantly reflected in his actions: giving away the bounty of Venezuela puts Chavez at risk of being seen as not working in the interests of the Venezuelan population. However, Chavez has, apparently successfully convinced the Venezuelan people that the assistance of other countries is the proper course of action. Without the perception of being a political and economic saviour of the Venezuelan people, he would be unable to rule with the same mandate he has enjoyed. By promoting his ideology in the “near abroad,” the Latin American Region, he runs the risk of losing support domestically, if his base support, the poor, do not see tangible results from his domestic programs. However, without promoting his ideology of revolutionary social justice, he would not gain support domestically in the first place. This is why he has adopted such a controlling approach to the media and communications. He must control the message that is released so that he can continue to walk the tightrope he has chosen.
There remains to be answered the reason that Chavez so dogmatically attacks the United States. Why does he not try to play a similar game with the government of the US that he does with other regional authorities? In the absence of such ovations, why does he engage in such over-the-top polemics that often wander in to the realm of the absurd? The answer is quite simple. Chavez realizes that for his own rhetoric to gain popular acceptance, his audience must have someone to blame for anything that goes wrong. The United States is the perfect scapegoat for these problems based on its history and economic policies. The United States has a history of supporting repressive anti-socialist regimes throughout Latin America. The United States is also the base of many multi-national corporations that the left has successfully portrayed as being responsible for much of the poverty in Latin America. The United States is the symbol of runaway capitalism for the world. Chavez purports to be the antithesis of this, that is, compassionate socialism. This compassionate socialism, to a greater extent, defines Venezuela’s grand Strategy. Diatribes against the United States help foster this image. Chavez’s offer of cheap oil to the ostensibly liberal Eastern Seaboard states also allows him to claim that he cares more for the impoverished people of the United States than their own government does.
Also, basic populism entails union against an outside force. It is far easier for Chavez to unify his people, and pressure them into adopting his policies, if the United States is looming over them, the imperialistic capitalist state. To assist in this assertion, Chavez has created a civilian military force designed to protect the homeland against any potential invasion. However, the obvious nature of this as a public relations endeavour can be seen when it is put into practice: the “troops” are ill trained, ill-coordinated, and in the event of an invasion, would be highly incapable of mounting a resistance (Feinman). However, for Chavez’s purposes, none of this matters. What matters is that the population is more concerned with the enemy abroad, than the potential enemy at home.
This criticism of the United States is not without risk. The United States is a very dangerous enemy. Chavez has already experienced the repercussions of this in the 2002 coup attempt that was backed by the United States. However, every implication of disapproval towards Chavez that emanates from the United States merely serves to solidify Chavez’s position in Venezuela and Latin America. Even his inability to gain a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations could work to his advantage. He need only blame it upon the capitalist empire that is the United States, and his well primed audience will excuse his referencing George W. Bush as the devil.

Conclusion
What we find that is most interesting in Chavez’s policy is the combination of dogmatic devotion to ideology without the naïve political ineptitude that so often accompanies it. Instead we see a cold pragmatism, political realism with the pursuit of ideology, cleverly disguised as apocalyptic populism. What Chavez has done is created a new mode of idealism that takes advantage of the world system instead of trying to overthrow it, while at the same creating a façade of radical change.
Another trend that Chavez is at the head of is the rejection of US global hegemony. By constantly criticizing the United States, and aggressively seeking other trading partners and oil importers, Chavez is sending a message for developing countries in the future that they need not look to the lone superpower as the source of wealth. He demonstrates this by becoming something of a benefactor himself: dolling out oil money to countries in need to show that any country can be generous, and to build solidarity among those countries to which he wishes to export his “revolution.”

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"Jesus said: I have cast fire upon the world, and behold I guard it until it is ablaze."
Gospel of Thomas

Works Cited
Collins, Sheila D. "Breaking the Mold? Venezuela's Defiance of the Neoliberal Agenda." New Political Science 27.3 (2005): 367-395.
Corrales, Javier. "Foreign Policy." Foreign Policy (2006). 2 Jan. 2007 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3332&print=1>.
Dorschner, Jim. "The Bolivarian Revolution." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings June 2006: 6. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Ritter. 28 Jan. 2007.
Golinger, Eva. The Chavez Code. Olive Branch P, 2006.
Neak, Laura. The New Foreign Policy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
Rodriguez, Francisco. "Why Chavez Wins." Foreign Policy (2007). 2 Jan. 2007 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3685&print=1>.
Singer, David J. “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations.” The International System: Theoretical Essays Princeton University Press, 1961. pp. 77-92
Gilbert, Jonathan “Populism: Archival Concept or 21st Century Reality?” Prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association annual convention, Chicago, February-March 2007.






News Article Appendix
"Chavez Tells Washington to "Go to Hell"" Yahoo News 22 Jan. 2007. <http://www.news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070122/ts_nm/chavez_venezuela_us_dc_4&printer=1>.
Eviatar, Daphne. "Latin Left Turn." The Nation 25 Dec. 2006: 5-6.
Feinman, Sacha. "Bananas." New Republic 26 Oct. 2006: 42. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Ritter. 28 Jan. 2007.
Palmeri, Christopher, and Geri Smith. "Chavez Starts Punishing America." Business Week 25 Sept. 2006: 39. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Ritter, Ritter. 28 Jan. 2007. Keyword: Chavez.
Rohter, Larry. "Venezuela Wants Trade Group to Embrace Anti-Imperialism." New York Times 19 Jan. 2007. 22 Jan. 2007 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/world/americas/19latin.html>.
"The World According to Chavez." Economist 30 Sept. 2006: 47-48. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Ritter. 28 Jan. 2007.
“Pat Robertson calls for assassination of Hugo Chavez” USA Today 22 Aug. 2005. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-22-robertson-_x.htm>.

__________________
"Jesus said: I have cast fire upon the world, and behold I guard it until it is ablaze."
Gospel of Thomas