Just posting this here for anyone interested.

The government has basically admitted the Gulf of Tonkin event was a lie.

See the NSA archive at GWU University.

Tonkin Gulf Intelligence "Skewed"
According to Official History and Intercepts

Newly Declassified National Security Agency Documents Show Analysts Made "SIGINT fit the claim" of North Vietnamese Attack

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 132 - Update

Newly Declassified National Security Agency History Questions Early Vietnam War Communications Intelligence

THE EVIDENCE for Pearl Harbor is a little more extensive...................

January 27, 1941 Joseph C. Grew, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, wired Washington that he had learned information that Japan, in the event of trouble with the U.S., was planning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

April: U.S. intelligence officers continue to monitor Japanese secret messages. In a program code-named Magic, U.S. intelligence uses a machine to decode Japan's diplomatic dispatches. Washington does not communicate all the available information to all commands, including Short and Kimmel in Hawaii.

May: Japanese Adm. Nomura informs his superiors that he has learned Americans were reading his message traffic. No one in Tokyo believes the code could have been broken. The code is not changed.

July: Throughout the summer, Adm. Yamamoto trains his forces and finalizes the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Sept. 24: The "bomb plot" message from Japanese naval intelligence to Japan's consul general in Honolulu requesting a grid of exact locations of ships in Pearl Harbor is deciphered. The information is not shared with the Hawaii's Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short.

http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/RD-PEARL.html

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After 24 November 1941, events in U.S.-Japanese diplomatic negotiations moved very swiftly to their climax on 7 December. A number of important diplomatic messages passed between Tokyo and Washington between July and November; these are summarized below. These early messages and those exchanged after 24 November which have been selected for inclusion in this appendix are so revealing that it is easy to lose sight of the fact that U.S. officials were often reading these messages at about the same time as the Japanese diplomats. The "War Warning" messages sent by OPNAV beginning on 24 November have also been included in this appendix to insure that the reader fully appreciates their correlation with events occurring in diplomatic circles.

N 25 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 15 November with detailed instructions on how to destroy code machines.
N 28 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 19 November with detailed instructions to listen for "Winds Execute" messages to be added to Japanese news broadcasts in case of diplomatic emergencies involving the U.S., England, or Russia. When heard, embassies were to destroy all codes, papers, etc.
N 26 Nov A circular message from Tokyo to Washington on 19 November, sent after above message but translated earlier, contained instructions to listen for an abbreviated "Winds" message in general intelligence broadcasts repeated five times at beginning and end, i.e., only the word East, West, or North would be spoken five times.
A 28 Nov Circular message from Tokyo on 20 November said U.S.-Japanese situation would not "permit any further conciliation by us" and rejected all feelings of optimism.
A 22 Nov Tokyo informed Washington on 22 November that, by 29 November if agreement had not been reached, "things are automatically going to happen."
24 Nov OPNAV message warned of possible Japanese "aggressive movement" toward Philippines, Guam, or any direction.
A 26 Nov Tokyo message to Washington on 26 November contained telephone brevity code to be used because "telegrams take too long." The code covered topics under negotiation, situations, and personalities.
27 Nov OPNAV WAR WARNING message.
A 29 Nov Message on 26 November from Nomura to Tokyo recommended that Japan break diplomatic relations with the U.S. in a formal manner rather than "enter on scheduled operations" without prior announcement particularly since "our intention is a strict military secret." A formal break would avoid responsibility for the "rupture."
N 2 Dec A circular message from Tokyo on 27 November contained another brevity code in which codewords were assigned specific meanings, e.g., "Japan's and USA's military forces have clashed" equals, "HIZIKATA MINAMI."

-68-

page 69

N 28 Nov A telephone conversation on 27 November between Washington (Kurusu) and a foreign office official in Tokyo named Yamamoto. Tokyo used telephone code to convey a message referring to an attack on the U.S.
29 Nov OPNAV WAR WARNING message. Text indicated Army had also been notified.
A 1 Dec Message from Tokyo to Berlin on 30 November directed the Japanese ambassador to inform Germany that U.S. relations had ruptured and that "war may break out quicker than anyone dreams." Regarding Russia, Tokyo stated that if Russia reacted to her move southward and joined hands with England and the U.S., Japan was "ready to turn on her with all our might." Tokyo requested the Germans and Italians to maintain "absolute secrecy."
N 1 Dec Message from Tokyo to Washington discussed means of allaying U.S. suspicions regarding Japanese reactions to the U.S. proposal of 26 November. News media were to be advised that "negotiations are continuing." A plan was discussed to make a formal presentation in Washington vice Tokyo. The message queried president's reaction to Tojo's bellicose speech.
N 1 Dec A circular message from Tokyo on 1 December advised Washington that London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila had been instructed to destroy code machines.
2 Dec OPNAV instructed CINCAF to establish defensive patrols.
A 4 Dec Message from Rome to Washington on 2 December said that Tokyo believed the Hull note of 26 November "absolutely unacceptable," and "a conflict(?) in the near future is considered very probable." Rome also said Tokyo believed American Navy in Pacific was "not strong enough for decisive action."
N 3 Dec Message from Tokyo to Washington on 2 December instructed Washington to burn all codes except one copy of the codes being used in conjunction with the machine (i.e., PURPLE, the O Code, and the abbreviation code. Washington was also to burn messages, other secret papers, and telegraphic codes, and possibly to destroy one machine.
3 Dec An OPNAV message regarding Japanese instructions to burn codes.
N 6 Dec Messages from Berlin and Rome to Tokyo on 3 December described Japanese attempts to obtain German and Italian assurances that they would follow the Japanese declaration of war on the U.S. with their own. Hitler was not available, but Mussolini agreed.

-69-

page 70

4 Dec OPNAV ordered U.S. codes destroyed.
N 6 Dec Washington confirmed destruction of codes on 5 December.
N 6 Dec Tokyo message on 5 December ordered four individuals in Washington to leave immediately. The translation contained a note which identified one as head of Japanese espionage in the Western Hemisphere and the others as his assistants.
A 6 Dec Tokyo message to Washington on 6 December alerted Nomura that a formal reply to the 26 November note had been prepared, was very long, and would be in 14 parts.

The messages quoted in this appendix are taken from Radio Intelligence Publication Number 87Z, "The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War," Vol. I, Section A, by Ensign John V. Connorton, USNR. SRH-012, RG 457.

Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924-1941

These are from What Really Happened.

I have not verified these, but I can't think of any "fake" government documents I have ever found on the net.


Dec. 3 N 6991 25644 Tokyo 111 Make your "ships in harbor"

report irregular but twice a

week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19).

**Dec. 4 N 7001 JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to

be the (missing) translation of

the Winds Message.

*Dec. 3 A 7017 25640 Tokyo 867 Washington burn all codes except

one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and

"L" (LA). Stop using the code

machine and destroy it com-

pletely when you have finished

this, wire back "HARUNA."

Destroy all messages files and

other secret documents. (Dec. 2,

1941.)

#Dec. 4 A 7029 25694 Tokyo 114 Investigate fleet air bases in

or 111 Hawaii (Nov. 20, 1941-J19.)

#Dec. 5 A 7063 25773 Tokyo 113 Report ships in Pearl Harbor,

Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941 -

J19.)

#Dec. 5 A 7064 25772 Honolulu 224 Spy report. (Nov. 18, 1941)

*Dec. 5 N 7086 25823 Tokyo 122 In the future report even when

there are no (ship) movements

(Nov 29, 1941-J19.)

#Dec. 5 N 7091 25787 Tokyo 2443 London discontinue use of code

machine and dispose of it immed-

iately. (Dec. 1)

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/pe...m/Pentagon/631 5/magic.html

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More From the NAVY Site..............

"This appendix contains seventy-two selected Japanese naval messages intercepted between September and 4 December 1941 by Navy intercept sites at Hawaii, Guam, and Corregidor; these messages were not decoded and translated until September 1945-May 1946."

[not pasting any of these since they were allegedly translated after the attack-norrin]

Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924-1941

///

Even if you only look at the diplomatic messages, ruling out all the other evidence, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to see what's going on.

Here is an interesting piece I just found while looking for the messages.........

"America's very success, in September 1940, in breaking the Japanese diplomatic cipher, code named "Purple," had the ironic effect of distracting attention from where it could have been more profitably focused in the fateful months leading up to Pearl Harbor. The Purple cipher carried the highest-level diplomatic messages of the Japanese Empire; this was intelligence of such remarkable value that it was given the code name magic. The Purple cipher was generated by a complex machine. It used a cascade of rotating switches to encipher every letter of a message in a different key from the last or the next. In one position of the switches the letter A would become G; in the next it would become P. The U.S. Army's code breakers had, in eighteen months of intense effort, deduced the wiring and setup of the machine without ever seeing one, a feat of pure analysis the likes of which had scarcely before been seen. After hastily soldering together telephone switches and relays to produce a replica of the machine, they proceeded to decode the Japanese messages almost as quickly as they arrived."

"On the morning of December 3, 1941, a Purple message came through ordering Japan's embassy in Washington to destroy its code books, and even one of its two vital Purple machines. Frank Rowlett, a senior cryptanalyst of the Army's Signal Intelligence Service, arrived at his office at noon that day from a meeting, plucked this latest magic decrypt from his in-box, and proceeded to read its contents with mounting incredulity. With only a single machine it would obviously be impossible for the embassy to continue its normal flow of business. Colonel Otis Sadtler, who was in charge of distributing the magic decrypts, showed up in Rowlett's office at that moment and began to pepper him with questions. Had the Japanese ever sent anything like this before? Could they be getting ready to change their codes? Perhaps they suspected their current codes had been broken? Then the only possible meaning of this extraordinary message sank in. Sadtler pulled himself to attention. "Rowlett, do you know what this means? It means Japan is about to go to war with the United States!" And, decrypt in hand, Sadtler took off literally running down the corridor of the Munitions Building to alert the head of Army intelligence."


War with Japan

The next piece comes from a person who doesn't believe in foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl.

How can that be?

The author continues...........

"But diplomatic communications are not the place where military orders are delivered. America knew that Japan was going to strike; it did not know where she would strike. To know that would require breaking into the Japanese naval codes, and there was only one catch: Since mid-1939, America had not read a single message in the main Japanese naval code on the same day it had been sent. For most of the period from June 1, 1939, to December 7, 1941, the Navy was working on naval messages that were months, or even over a year, old."

Hmmmm. They knew Japan was going to strike, but they did not know where.

Hmmm, where could it be?????

Hey, maybe we could ask the US ambassador to Japan. Of the major US military bases in the Eastern Pacific, Pearl Harbor was closest to Japan, the most vulnerable to air attack and it had the prize of three aircraft carriers in her harbor when the Japanese strike force left port.

U.S. intelligence services had direct access to Japanese coded transmissions, so U.S. officials were well aware that the Japanese were planning something against them—they just did not know precisely what. One man in particular, Admiral Richmond K. Turner, strongly urged that U.S. forces be placed on a higher state of alert, as he was particularly concerned about the U.S. Navy base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. During previous U.S. war games and exercises, Pearl Harbor had proven highly vulnerable to surprise attacks. Although Turner’s advice was considered, only some of his recommendations were implemented.

SparkNotes: World War II (1939–1945): Japan and Pearl Harbor

O.K, so some Admiral guy, pfft, what the hell does he know, was particuarly concerned about Pearl Harbor, the US Ambassador to Japan had warned months earlier of an attack at Pearl, Admiral Richardson destroyed his career because he fought FDR on leaving the fleet vulnerable at Pearl, it was our closest MAJOR base to Japan, the most vulnerable, had the most targets, including a prize of three aircraft carriers is her harbor when the Japanese strike force left Japan, so hmmmmmmmmmm, where could the attack be?

# 1932 - In the Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercises, 152 aircraft carrier planes caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
# 1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise.
# 1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.

Pearl Harbor - Mother of All Conspiracies

Hmmmmmmm, where could the attack be?

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Pearl Harbor Evidence Part 2..............

Actual scans of the McCollum memo

The McCollum Memo: The Smoking Gun of Pearl Harbor

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Advance Warning?
The Red Cross Connection

By Daryl S. Borgquist

Naval History, June 1999

http://www.usni.org/NavalHistory/Art...borgquist6.htm

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In 1973, former Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Adm. J.O. Richardson, Kimmel's predecessor, said that, "the Report of the Roberts Commission was the most unfair, unjust, and deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government Printing Office." Adm. Richardson was only able to say that because on February 21, 1944, 806 days after the attack, Capt. Laurance Safford blew the whistle to Adm. Kimmel about America's success decrypting Japanese codes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

The decrypted codes gave indications of the place of the Pearl Harbor attack, the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the reason for the Pearl Harbor attack, and the deceit plan to cover the Pearl Harbor attack. Kimmel and Short received none of this information even though it was available in Washington, Manila and London. After learning about this, Adm. Kimmel initiated the next eight Pearl Harbor inquiries, and not surprisingly, the only one that accorded him the opportunity to defend himself -- the Naval Court of Inquiry -- exonerated him.

Congress passed a law in 2000 recommending that this administration advance Kimmel and Short on the retired list. To date, the administration has not done so, and refuses to release requested information explaining why.

http://usa.mediamonitors.net/headlin...f_national_com mission

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The Navy Court of Inquiry, met between 20 July 1944 and 20 October 1944. The net result of the Courts inquiry is the complete exoneration of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel while serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet on 7 December 1941. We single out for special mention this portion of the Opinion.

Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, he did not transmit immediately information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. [10]

On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor (review)

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Admiral Richardson lost his job because he dared to argue against FDR's wish to station the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. Why would he risk his career like that?

For a great piece on Admiral Richardson, see..................

http://www.usna.com/classes/1942/UDT4.htm

Besides being a non-deterrent, he reasoned, the Fleet was geographically vulnerable, 2,000 miles closer to the potential enemy. Throughout 1940, he sent numerous letters and dispatches to Washington pointing out the flaws in Fleet combat readiness and requesting the resources to rectify them. He emphasized them all to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox during the latter's visit to Hawaii....all to no avail.



Then he made two trips to Washington to apprise President Roosevelt of the situation and seek his intercession to bring the fleet up to fighting trim or, failing that, return it to its West Coast, less vulnerable bases. Roosevelt did neither.



Political considerations dominated Roosevelt’s thinking. He clung to the illusion that keeping the Fleet in Hawaii would discourage Japanese aggression. Moreover, it was election year and he was more interested in his political image as a peace guarantor than in preparing the nation for self defense.



When his second eye-to-eye appeal to Roosevelt was rebuffed, Oct. 7, 1940, Richardson tried to shock the president by telling him bluntly that the senior officers of the Navy did not have the trust and confidence in their civilian leadership for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific. Roosevelt was shocked all right, but he did not change his policies. Instead, he changed the command of the Fleet to a new incumbent, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and history recorded the results.



In its reporting of the incident, L1FE magazine referred to the relieved commander as "Burly Admiral Richardson." A dictionary defines "burly" as "rough, bulky and bluff." That was not the Richardson I knew. Big he was, but courtly and courteous....a true Texas gentleman of the old school. He was a God-fearing man of high moral principles. He lived by a motto given him by his Stepmother when he left Texas for the Naval Academy: '`The wise man seeks to outshine himself. The fool seeks to outshine others."



Despite the humiliating ignominy of his firing, and the belated vindication of his assessment of the pre-Pearl Harbor situation, he maintained a stoic silence in public on the issues swirling around the turbulent years of World War II and beyond, never criticizing Roosevelt or any of the other key players in the drama. He burned his diary because he feared he had recorded some observations that, if published, might hurt others. Only when he was terminally ill did he authorize the publication of his memoirs.

////////

In the first part of 1941, joint military staff conferences took place between the Americans, British, Canadians, and the Dutch to develop plans for global war against the Axis, although the U.S. was not yet a belligerent. Of greatest importance for the Pacific theater was a meeting in Singapore in April 1941 between the Americans, British, and Dutch. Out of this meeting came the ADB (sometimes called ABCD because of the Canadian involvement in the other meetings) agreement, which committed the conferees to joint action to fight Japan if Japanese forces crossed a geographic line that approximated the northerly extremity of the Dutch East Indies. War would result if Japan invaded British or Dutch territories in Southern Asia or moved into neutral Thailand. In essence, Roosevelt had committed the U.S. to war even if American territory were not attacked. And he had committed the U.S. to war even if the Japanese did not fire the first shot. Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon try to argue that the ADB agreement did not actually commit the U.S. to make war but only "outlined the military strategy to be followed if the U.S. joined the conflict."12 This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that central to the ADB agreement was the criterion for joining the conflict--the Japanese crossing of a particular geographical line. Even one of the early defenders of the Roosevelt administration, Herbert Feis, acknowledged this significance in his history: "Had not the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, this line would have become the boundary between war and peace."13

A secret memo General MacArthur received in September 1941 underscored the offensive purposes that American forces would undertake. It read

commence operation as soon as possible, concentrating on propaganda, terrorism, and sabotage of Japanese communications and military installations . . . Assassination of individual Japanese should also be considered. Prepare to defeat Japan without suffering grievous loss ourselves. . . We must base mobile forces as near to Japan as is practicable. . . To the west there is China where air bases are already being prepared and stocked. . . . to the south there is Luzon in the Philippine Islands, within easy air range of Hainan, Formosa, and Canton, and extreme range of southern Japan. . . Development of further air bases is proceeding.17

TOQ-Stephen J. Sniegoski-Pearl Harbor-Vol 1 No 2

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On 23 June 1941 - one day after Hitler's attack on Russia - Secretary of the Interior and FDR's Advisor Harold Ickes wrote a memo for the President in which he pointed out that "there might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia."

On 18 October Ickes noted in his diary: "For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan."

The U.S. had cracked key Japanese codes before the attack. FDR received "raw" translations of all key messages. On 24 September 1941 Washington deciphered a message from the Naval Intelligence HQ in Tokyo to Japan's consul general in Honolulu, requesting grid of exact locations of U.S. Navy ships in the harbor. Commanders in Hawaii were not warned.

Sixty years later the U.S. Government still refuses to identify or declassify many pre-attack decrypts on the grounds of "national security."

On November 25 Secretary of War Stimson wrote in his diary that FDR said an attack was likely within days, and asked "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." On November 25 FDR received a "positive war warning" from Churchill that the Japanese would strike against America at the end of the first week in December. This warning caused the President to do an abrupt about-face on plans for a time-buying modus vivendi with Japan and it resulted in Secretary of State Hull's deliberately provocative ultimatum of 26 November 1941 that guaranteed war.

On November 26 Washington ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington, out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as possible". This order included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection. On the same day Cordell Hull issued his ultimatum demanding full Japanese withdrawal from Indochina and all China. U.S. Ambassador to Japan called this "The document that touched the button that started the war."

TRUE DEMOCRACY Fall 2001

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I leave you with one last piece for your consideration........

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy
Charles Lutton

Pearl Harbor -- Fifty Years of Controversy



It is obvious from examining all the evidence that FDR wanted to be sure that the attack appeared to be a surprise for several reasons.

1) He wanted the attack to be bad so that it would anger the American people into supporting a war in which over a million Americans died, or were wounded.[Battle Deaths 291,557 Other Deaths in Service (Non-Theater) 113,842 Non-mortal Woundings 671,846] FDR needed the people to be willing to sacrifice for the war and for the war industry, as so many people were needed for the war effort. There were 16 million servicemembers. 16 MILLION. The population of the US was 133 million. That means 12% of the population served in the armed forces. The sacrifices were large, by all Americans and these sacrifices needed a good cause. Pearl Harbor was that cause.

US Population: From 1900

cache:Lj6PyT6PbQMJ:www.va.gov/pressrel/a - Google Search mwars01.doc+total+servicemembers+wwii&hl=en&gl=us& ct=clnk&cd=2


2) He wanted to minimize the chances of US forces firing the first shot, or even doubt as to who fired the first shot. He wanted an attack which left no doubt as to who was the agressor. This would allow him to keep his empty promises of not wanting to enter the war, by having the American people demand he go to war.

“We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put in the wrong and makes the first bad move — overt move,” confided Secretary of War Henry Stimson in an October 16, 1941 diary entry. On November 25, Stimson elaborated on this idea in a description of cabinet discussions about the impending conflict with the Japanese: “The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”

http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/link...s/50_10-11.pdf

3) Possibly the most important reason for FDR wanting the attack to be a surprise is because he wanted to be sure that the Japs would not suspect we had broken their diplomatic code. There is speculation we also had broken their naval code before Pearl, but I have yet to see this proven. We had the japs diplomatic codes which they thought were unbreakable. If we allowed a surprise attack, they would think their code was safe. Clearly, the value of having both the diplomatic and the naval codes during the war can't be overestimated.

Diplomatic codes were broken before Pearl, but the official date given for the breaking of the Naval Codes is.....

'[May 1942 - U.S. Navy codebreakers broke theJN25b code - "'JN' for Japanese Navy, '25' for the 25th code they had worked on, 'b' for its second edition. It had come into use near the end of 1940, and by early 1942 the Americans had recovered enough codegroups to read bits and pieces of Japanese messages." (Kahn)'

http://history.acusd.edu/gen/ww2timeline/espionage.html

[/i]The official US Navy statement on JN-25B is the NAVAL SECURITY GROUP HISTORY TO WORLD WAR II prepared by Captain J. Holtwick in June 1971 who quotes Captain Safford, the chief of OP-20-G, on page 398: By 1 December 1941 we had the code solved to a readable extent.[i]--(HE IS REFERRING TO NAVAL CODES but "readable extent" is vague--Norrin)

Pearl Harbor: Mother of all conspiracies

imagine lieing to the people in order to go to war... thank goodness that would never happen these days...


heros like don rumsfield
william kristol
paul worfowits
dick cheney
jeb bush
and the rest of the P.N.A.C patriots would never propagandize the american people into a war.

I was kind of surprised no one challenged my Pearl Harbor info, but I guess the people here are capable of recognizing the truth when they see it. I am surprised, but happily surprised.

Just a few years ago, if you questioned the Iraq war you were unAmerican, funny how you don't hear that any more. It takes a while for the people to wake up, as the American people are not stupid. We are lazy, selfish, buried in denial, but we are not stupid.

Hermann Goering when he was being held in prison during the trials at Nuremberg in 1946. This account comes to us from Gustave M. Gilbert, the German-speaking prison psychologist who had free access to all of the prisoners during the trials and talked to them frequently in private. On the evening of April 18, 1946, Gilbert visited Goering in his cell, and he later described their conversation as follows:

We got around to the subject of war again and I said that, contrary to his attitude, I did not think that the common people are very thankful for leaders who bring them war and destruction.

“Why, of course, the people don’t want war,” Goering shrugged. “Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece. Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.”

“There is one difference,” I pointed out. “In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States only Congress can declare war.”

“Oh, that is all well and good, but, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country."

War and Leviathan: The Trick that Works Every Time: The Independent Institute

People ignoring your post != people agreeing with your post.

__________________
De duobus malis, minus est semper eligendum

Thanks.

I am very happy that many people have finally realized that FDR intentionally provoked the attack on Pearl, wanted it to happen and was aware that an attack was imminent.

While it can still be debated if FDR knew Pearl was the target, he at least knew that Pearl was ONE of the most likely targets and the fact that those men were sacrificed so that the US could enter the war is something many educated Americans seem to have accepted.

It is nice to be able to come to a place, like this discussion forum, where many people are educated. It is very frustrating talking to people in real life who know little to nothing about "real history."

!= is shorthand for "does not equal"

__________________
When they come a wull staun ma groon
Staun ma groon al nae be afraid
Thoughts awe hame tak awa ma fear
Sweat an bluid hide ma veil awe tears

I seriously doubt FDR knew an attack was imminent, or even planned. Hindsight is 20/20 while foresight is a crap shoot. But, conspiracy theorists need something to do too.

__________________
Andy
Cynical Optimist

Thanks for stating your opinion on a topic you know NOTHING ABOUT.

Jeesh.

Maybe if you bothered to read the evidence I provided, you would not look so ignorant.

25 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary "FDR stated that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday." FDR asked: "the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors."

27 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson sent a confused and confusing hostile action possible or DO-DON'T warning. The Navy Court found this message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor, rather than toward it. One purpose of the message was to mislead HI into believing negotiations were continuing. The Army which could not do reconnaissance was ordered to and the Navy which could was ordered not to. The Army was ordered on sabotage alert, which specifically precluded attention to outside threat. Navy attention was misdirected 5000 miles from HI. DC repeated, no less than three times as a direct instruction of the President, "The US desires that Japan commit the first overt act Period." It was unusual that FDR directed this warning, a routine matter, to Hawaii which is proof that he knew other warnings were not sent. A simple question--what Japanese "overt act" was FDR expecting at Pearl Harbor? He ordered sabotage prevented and subs couldn't enter, that leaves air attack. The words "overt act" disclose FDR's intent - not just that Japan be allowed to attack but that they inflict damage on the fleet. This FDR order to allow a Japanese attack was aid to the enemy - explicit treason.

If you want to pay 19 dollars at JSTOR you can go here........

Cookie Absent

If not, you can go here.......

What We Knew before the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Late in November, 1941 the following order was sent out to all U.S. military commanders: "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." According to Secretary of War Stimson, this order came directly from Roosevelt. According to Stimson's diary, 9 people in the war cabinet, all the military people, knew about FDR's plan of provocation.

The State Department knew on November 20th [1941] that a naval force which included four of the largest Japanese aircraft carriers was heading towards Hawaii, and this information was passed on to Pearl Harbor on November 27th. However, the American base in Hawaii was not given this information. Three days before the attack, Australian Intelligence spotted the Japanese fleet heading for Hawaii. They sent a warning to Washington, but it was dismissed by Roosevelt who said it was a politically motivated rumor circulated by the Republicans.

On December 1, 1941, the head of the Far East Division of U.S. Naval Intelligence wrote in his report to head of the Pacific Fleet: "War between the United States and Japan will begin in the nearest future." The Report never made it to the commander's desk, because it had been 'accidentally' detained by his superiors.

Early in December, Army Intelligence knew that the diplomats at the Japanese Embassy in Washington had been ordered to destroy all codes and to return to Japan. Washington also knew that Japan had ordered all of its merchant ships home, because they would be needed to transport soldiers and supplies for the war. On December 5, Col. Sadtler from U.S. Military Communications transmitted the following telegram to his superiors, based on information he had received: "War with Japan will begin immediately; exclude all possibility of a second Port Arthur." This telegram never got to its destination.

Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobold, USN retired, author of The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, and Col. Curtis B. Dall, the son-in-law of FDR, in an interview with Anthony Hilder for his book Warlords of Washington admitted that they [FDR and his staff] knew about the Pearl Harbor attack before it occurred. Theobold, the Commander of all the destroyers at Pearl Harbor, said in his book that Roosevelt knew about the attack 21 hours before it happened. Theobold wrote:

"An incontestable fact in the true history of Pearl Harbor is the repeated withholding from Admiral Kimmel and General Walter C. Short [the Navy and Army commanders at Pearl Harbor] of supremely important military information ... There's never been a case in history when a commander was not informed that his country will be at war within a few hours and that his forces will most likely become the first object of attack at sunrise."

http://www.modernhistoryproject.org/...=FinalWarn06-3

THERE IS MUCH MORE AT THE LINKS AND AT THE LINKS IN MY PREVIOUS POSTS.

Or, you could actually DO YOUR OWN RESEARCH.

Yeah, right, like that's going to happen.

All tantalizing evidence of a conspiracy, true, but it's all circumstantial and there's no smoking gun, and in hindsight everything makes sense, but if you were exposed to those messages in real time, they might just be a little confusing.

Here's an example from the same war.
The British had broken the german naval code, based on a code machine similar to the Purple machine, they gave the US the exact locations and courses of U-Boats headed to the US east coast.
Operation Drumbeat was a huge success, the U-Boats sunk over 100 ships, killing over 5000 sailors, without suffering a single casualty, the US destroyer fleet remained in port, why?
Because Admiral King didn't like the British and didn't trust the British, and didn't believe the British. So he kept his destroyers in port, to save fuel, because he was convinced that the British couldn't possibly obtain that kind of information, so they must just be making it up, and he wasn't going to waste his fleet chasing phantom U-Boats.

So here's an Admiral already in a state of war, getting information from an Ally and totally discounting it because of his own personal prejudices.

Back to Pearl Harbor.

Read those messages again, but try to imagine that you never heard of Pearl Harbor, then they aren't as compelling a case.
FDR couldn't launch an attack on Japan, it would have been political suicide, the congress would never have given him a declaration of war, and the public was opposed to war.
So the only thing he do is wait for it, and try to build up the war production as much as he could before actual hostilities began.

__________________
“ The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.”

Adam Smith , The Wealth of Nations 1776

"We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals; we know now that it is bad economics"
FDR's second Inaugural Address

Declassified study puts Vietnam events in new light | csmonitor.com


The McCollum Memo:
The Smoking Gun of Pearl Harbor

The McCollum Memo: The Smoking Gun of Pearl Harbor

blind trust in government is very dangerous

__________________
Israel may have the right to put others on trial, but certainly no one has the right to put the Jewish people and the State of Israel on trial.
Ariel Sharon
CONGRESSMAN LARRY McDONALD EXPOSES THE NEW WORLD ORDER 1983

Goober,

While I see your point, it is not a good comparison. You see, the messages were not the only evidence. The most damning evidence is the diary entries of Stimson. But there is a lot more evidence. The recalling of all merchant vessels. The warning from the US ambassador to Japan.....


On January 27th, 1941, our ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, sent a message to Washington stating: “The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all their strength”

......the warning from Australia on the Japanese fleet, the ordering to the army to conduct recon, which was impossible for them to do and the order for the Navy not conduct recon, even though they were capable of doing so.

Then there are claims from people like Robert A. Theobold as well as
Oliver Lyttleton..........

Oliver Lyttleton, British Minister of Production, stated in 1944: “Japan was provoked into attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history to say that America was forced into the war.”

The Truth Seeker - Pearl Harbor: The Facts Behind the Fiction



////////


I mean come on, Churchill and FDR met "secretly" for the Atlantic Conference on two military ships, before Pearl Harbor and outlined plans for after the war, a war were not even a part of yet.

From the PBS documentary, actually pretty well done, but it left out a lot about Pearl..........

When Churchill returned to England, he told his cabinet that Roosevelt had made a secret promise that he would wage war against Nazi Germany, but not declare it.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Video, Chapter 21 - The Juggler | The Presidents | American Experience | PBS

So, why would Roosevelt not just warn Pearl so they could have put up a good fight? Wouldn't we still have entered the war? Wouldn't FDR get what he wanted, an entrance into WWII?

Yes, he would have part of what he wanted, but what most people seem to forget is the sacrifices that the American people made for WWII. It is nothing like any other war since. While Korea and NAM both affected a lot of families, there were more families that were mostly unaffected. During WWII, almost ALL families were affected.

Total number of inductees for WWII (1940-1946)
including draftees before Pearl Harbor
10,110,114

By Year:
1940 - 18,633
1941 - 923,842
1942 - 3,033,361
1943 - 3,323,970
1944 - 1,591,942
1945 - 945,862
1946 - 183,383

militaryWWII

There were few families who didn't have one or more members fighting, or supporting the war through direct, or indirect support. At the peak I believe war efforts were 40% of GDP, all families had to ration many goods and were constantly bombarded with requests for donations to the boys at the front. The majority of Americans all sacrificed during this time, even though for more than a few who were unemployed before the Pearl Harbor attack, the war actually helped them financially.

Would Americans today be willing to sacrifice the same way as those who did in 1941-1945, if 911 was committed by Russia, or China and we need the same effort we needed during WWII to win the war?

FDR needed a horrific tragedy. He got one.

The fact that the attack on Pearl was a "surprise" helped in several ways.

It created urgency for the American people. The fact we could be so vulnerable was scary to many people and the "surprise" attack was appalling to the people, and enlistments into the military of course skyrocketed after the cowardly attack. The devastating attack also helped US industry realize the need to retool, even though they still didn't like it. It helped people commit to a long bloody war which killed 290,000- 400,000 (sources vary)Americans and wounded another 600,000 Americans. Remember the population in 1941 was 133,402,471 so over 10% of Americans, 16 million, served in the war. This is a HUGE commitment.

Also, besides all of these advantages we also had the Japanese diplomatic codes broken and some of their naval codes broken which we used for most of the war. A HUGE ADVANTAGE. Most "official" sources claim that the Japanese Naval code JN-25 was broken in January of 1942. How convenient for the "surprise" attack at Pearl Harbor. Even if this is true, FDR would have been aware that we were at least "close" to breaking the Japs Naval codes.

If our forces had been ready for the attack at Pearl, the Japanese might have suspected their codes were broken and might changed them. This would have stolen a huge advantage for us during the war. For all of these reasons, the attack needed to be a "surprise."


If you look at ALL the pieces, it is obvious.............. he knew.